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Three general claims are made in the paper, First, the 
agenda or groupings in which alternatives are considered for adoption 
or elimination is a major parameter in determining what. a group 
will choose, Secondly, the nature of thi s influence is sufficiently 
systematic to yield to an analytical model . Finally, it is claimed 
tl�at this discovery has important practical implications, 
In support of the s e  claims the paper offe r s  a theory of the 
basis of the influence together with an attempt to capture this theor y  
within a mathematical model. T h e  results o f  a n  application of the 
theory to a real situation and the results of s everal series of experi­
ments are reported . 
ON US irqG T HE A GENDA T O  IN FLUENCE G R O U P  DECISIONS :  
T HE ORY, E X PERIMENTS, AND A N  A PPLICAT ION ! 
Charles R • .  Plott2 and Michael E .  Levine 3 
When a large group must choose one alternative from 
among many competing alternatives, how should they proceed in 
the case where there is one meeting to be devoted to the decision? 
We know from soc ial choice theory, Arrow [ 1 ], Sen [ 6 ], Plott 
[ 5 ], Fishburn ( 4 ], that there is no single "best". way to 
proceed, · Furthermore, we know, theoretically, that the out­
come of the process will depend upon the particular method used, but 
the amount of evidence for this propos ition reflects the very limited )
number of attempts to validate it and is therefore spars e .  
We had the opportunity t o  consider this problem in the case 
of a subgroup of a large flying club which was faced with the problem 
of deciding from .among many competing fleets of planes which one 
would be available for the member s to fly. · The selection was to 
·be made by a' vote of the membership at a meeting and one of us was
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responsible for devising an agenda which would allow deliberations 
to proceed in some orderly fashion. This is no simple task s ince 
the alternatives numbered in the thousands; there were over fifty 
members and tastes were strongly held (flying is a demanding and 
expensive recreation which tends to occupy a large proportion of its 
devotees 1 leisure time and recreational expenditure s )  and differed 
radically among members .of the club, 
There were many "good" procedure s  and no theoretically 
"best" procedures, Since there was no uniquely fair procedure, and 
we thought that different "good" agendas would produce different 
outcomes ,  we decided to adopt the "good" procedure most likely to  
get  the group to choos e  the fleet of planes we considered optimum, 
Our motivations were mixed between feeling s of scientific curiosity 
and a desire,  all other things being equal, to have at our disposal the 
fleet of planes that best suited our tastes .  Our experiment was rather 
crude since the theory was not fully developed, we were under some 
tin:ie pressure, and our initial data left something to be desired. 
The proc edure was designed and the meeting took place. Our 
predictions of the outcome of this procedure depended entirely upon 
the sequencing of issues (agenda) for discussion and balloting purposes, 
The group cho s e  the fleet we wanted, Was the choice made by the 
group a result of our efforts or was it a happy accident ? If the agep.da 
ii;; important, can the natur e of its influence be characterized ? These 
important questions led us to undertake a systematic investigation, the 
results of which we r eport here, 
We make three general claims : first, the agenda or groupings 
in which alternative s  are considered for adoption or elimination can be 
a major parameter in determining what the group will ultimately choose. 
Second, the nature of· this influence is sufficiently systematic to yield 
to an analytical model. Finally, this discovery may have important 
practical implications. 
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The paper is outlined as follows: In the next, second, section 
we present the facts of the flying-club problem, It s erves simultaneously 
as an application of the theory and a demonstration of the importance 
of the consequences of the theory, In the third and fourth sections we 
outline a basic theory and a model. In the fifth section we discus s 
the results of s everal pilot experiments which we u s ed to help us 
refine the model and our methods of testing it .  The s ixth section 
includes our experimental design and the s eventh, the results , The s e  
a r e  of particular interest  s ince w e  know of n o  other attempts to apply 
experimental methodology to problems of this nature. In the final s ection 
we supply a summary of conclusions, 
II. THE FLYING CLUB: AN APPLICATION
A flying club is a nonprofit organization which purchases 
and maintains a fleet of airplanes for the purpose of renting them 
to its membe rs . The particular group with which we were concerned 
is a large { relative to other clubs )  subgroup of about s ixty�five members 
of a larger flying club. Our group had flown a fleet of five to s ix 
single-engined planes for a number of years, At the time of 'this s tµdy, 
a decision had been made to replace the group's existing fleet of planes ,  
The range of feasible choices for the group was large, because revenue 
from the sal� of some of the aircraft together with a loan which the 
club could eas ily obtain would enable the club to purchase a wide 
4 variety of types and numbers of plane s without additional capital levies 
on the membership. What fleet of planes should the club buy? 
A formal meeting of the group was called to advise the club 
board on the size and composition of the fleet. By that time, the 
4. Dues which consisted of an $1 800 depos it plus $30 per month 
were not affected by the choice of fleet. Dues go for the general over­
head of the club, and the $1 800
. 
is used as capital, The rental rate 
covers the rest, including r epayment of any �oans.  
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univer s e  of available aircraft had been narrowed by history, preliminary 
subcommittee meetings, and initial polling to conventional -tailed four­
place Beechcrafts, conventional- tailed s ix-place Beechcrafts, six-place 
Ces snas and turbochar ged six-place Ces snas, The s e  aircraft differed 
in cost, speed, capacity, and configuration, and many members had 
s trong preferences regarding them, The es timated differences in flying
costs are lis ted on figure 1 .  While the ultimate decision regarding
. rental fees would be made by the club board of directors, who frequently 
decided matters independently of the expressed preferences of the group, 
it is safe to as sume that members' expected higher costs of an aircraft 
would be reflected in the rental.fee for the particular airplane approxi­
mately. as illustrated here. 
Fig .  Types of Airplanes Available and some of Their Prominent 
Features 
Abbrevia-
Na1ne tion to be Manu-
us ed her e  facturer 
Bonanza A36 A B eechcraft 
Bonanza F33A F Beechcraft 
Refurbished E Beechcraft Bonanza E33A 
Ces sna 2 10 c Ces sna'. 
Ces sna Turbo-2 10 CT Cessna 
* 
Seating 
6 place 
4 place 
4 place 
6 place 
6 place 
{plus) 
Est. 
r ental 
rate per 
hour* 
3 1. 50 
30.00 
24 . 00 
2 7 . 00 
2 9.00 
Estimated for a fleet of s ix aircraft. These rates increase as the 
s ize of the fleet increases, s ince satisfying peak demand for use means 
that s torage, insurance, and capital recovery would be spread over fewer . 
flying hours per plane, 
We first specified our own preferences, Our most pre­
ferred alternative was a seven-plane fleet consis ting of thre e  
Bonanza E-3 3As (refurbished), plus either two more r efurbished 
5 
Es or twp new Fs, and two Ces sna 21 0 s ,  Our second preference was a 
six-plane fleet consisting of either five refurbished E- 3 3As (or our three 
Es. refurbished plus two new Fs ) ,  and one Cessna 210. The E -33As were 
the least expensive Beechcraft alternative, If six- seat Beechcraft 
(A- 3 6 s )  were to be included, we preferred one such aircraft to two, 
We like to ·fly a six-seat plane, but we also like to keep the cost down. 
Our ordering then was (where� indicates indifference): 
1st EEEEECC 
2nd EEEEEC 
3rd EEEEEEA 
4th EEEEEAA 
EEEFFCC 
EEEFFC 
EEEFFFA 
EEEFFAA 
Our second order of business was to design an agenda that 
would get us what we wanted, This meant that we had to ( 1 ) es timate 
the pattern of preferences among the group; (2)  theorize about their 
pos s ible voting behavior ; and (3 )  construct an agenda which s imlfl­
taneously was "fair" and afforded us the maximum pos s ible advantage. 
We es timated �ember ship preferences as follows : A small but 
very influential set of people wanted several Beechcraft A -3 6 s .  
This was the most prestigious s ingle-engined Beechcraft, luxurious 
and expensive to own and operate. Another small but influential 
group consisting mainly of the club 's governing board wanted .Ces sna 21 0s; 
This preference seems to have been related to the board ' s  relationship 
with Cessna, Inc. through the dealership. Members of the board 
would purch·ase Ces snas if given any opportunity at all. Most of the 
group preferred to continue to fly Bcechcraft, but a large s egment 
of the �embership s eemed to be worried about expenses  and would
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probably prefer inexpensive rather than expensive alternatives.  Many 
were also afraid that they would be forced into expensive aircraft by 
actions of the club or the board and so s aw themselves at a dis advantage 
from a strategic point of view. The preferences we estimated were 
roughly calculated as follows : 
35% 
1 s t  6 o r  more Es 
and Fs�' 
2nd several Es and Fs 
with a few C s  
3 r d  several Es and Fs 
with a few As* 
* 
35% 
6 or more Es 
and Fs 
several Es and Fs 
with a few As 
several Es and Fs 
with a few Cs 
1 0% 
mostly As 
3% 
mostly Cs 
"Es , "  "Fs, 11 and "As "  are all varieties of Beechcraft Bonanzas. 
See figure 1. 
Notice that our initial estimates indicated that we had a very 
difficult job indeed. What type of procedure should we use? We 
decided to use a process which involved an agenda. This would be a 
s eries of steps in which some s et of alternatives  would be eliminated 
with each step. We would then proc<;ed to des ign the agenda on the 
hypothesis that people would follow one of two decis ion rules :  they 
would either vote for the set which contained their most1 preferred 
alternative, or they would vote against the set which contained thelr 
least preferred alternative,  We system;>.tically used only the former, 
The agenda we cons tructed is shown as figure 2, The 
questions , without aerona.:.tical jargon, are as follows: 
l, What type of aircraft should the primary fleet be? This 
was to be decided by a Borda count (point voting), 
2, How many planes do we want.? 
3 .  Do we want a mixed fleet? 
FIGURE 2 
AGENDA GROUP 1 11 MEETING SEPT 20 
This is the agenda for the Group 1 1 1  equipment meeting to be held Sept. 20 at 
7:30 p. m. atl?Wm. Y our subcommittee has tried to define a series;C?f problems 
facing the group and to give you an opportunity to express your preferences in 
resolving them. We suggest that ¥OU take a few moments to look ov¢r this agenda 
and familarize yourselves with the choices ·facing us, then come to the meeting, 
participate in the discussion, and vote by show of hands on the choice� presented 
in alternatives 2-6. We would like to present the Board with the most compre­
hensive possible expression of Group 111 opinion. Please come. 
l. INTRODUCTION: 
A vailability, T ype v.ariety, P revious Depreciation problems, N eeds of. the Group 
vs, C ost, Safety, Radio Equipment. 
Z. PRIMARY A IRCRAFT TYPE: 
PROBLEM: Survey suggests that many Group 111 members prefer that the main 
part of the group fleet be four-seat B onanzas, Should these be all the same age? 
If so, we could sell all existing Bonanzas and buy new F-33A1s or we could 'sell 
only the V and F ahd buy used E-33A's. If they can be different ages, should we 
keep our E's and add new F's? O r  do we want C-Zl01s? Previous depreciation 
practices may affect these choices. 
INPUTS: 
Enl: Costs and rates for new F-33A's and refurbished E-J3A's. 
Depreciation problems. 
�: .tv!aintenancc compariFons. 
� : Availability and price of used aircraft. 
VOTE: PRIMARY FLEET TYPE SHOULD BE: 
a. All ne\" F-33A1s at about $29.00 hour;
4. SHOULD THE FLEET INCLUDE AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THE PRIMARY TYPE? 
PROBLEM: M ost members indicated an occasional need for a five or six place 
airplane. O thers indicated a desire to fly aircraft other than Bonanzas. There 
are advantages in scheduling, rate uniformity, maj ority choice, and type famil-
.. iarity in keeping the fleet homogeneous, The advantages of operating more than 
one type include optimizing for different mission requirements and accommodating 
minority preferences, 
INPUT: 
�: Safety aspects of·mixed fleets. 
�...:;'�: Survey input on desire for 5-place, 6-place, and mixed fleet. 
VOTE: FLEET SHOULD BE: 
a. All P rimary type; 
b, Mixture of mostly primary. type and some six-place. 
5. IF SOME SIX PLACE SHOULD BE INCLUDED, SHOULD THEY BE BONANZA 
A 36 OR 2101s? 
. 
PROBLEM: E ach of the two has advantages and disadvantages and different costs, 
INPUT:. 
r.r:.'..'� .. :.�.Cll : Weight and B alance and :Performance comparisons; 
t-r-"::':' ... ��·'.ll : M aintenance comparisons; 
!"',.;.__, __ ,� : 'A36 costs and advantages; 
. S!"'J�\'.:1:-:::J: 2 10 costs and advantages. 
VOTE: SHOULD SEC ONDARY AIRPLANES BE: 
a. A 36 at about $3/, $0 hour? 
b. c, -2 10 at about $27.00 hour? b. Refurbished· E-33A 1 s at about $�,_Q_Q hour; 
c. Mixed. new F-33A1s at about $28. 00 hour and refurbished F-33A's at about 
$24. 00 hour. 
' 6. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, 
d, New C -210's at ;i.bout $25. 00 hour. 
3, SIZE OF GROUP 111 FLEET: 
PROBLEM: Survey suggests that membership considers present availability to 
be unsatisfactory. This summer we operated with a little over five aircraft 
available, We have based our rates on 500 hrs. /yr. /aircraft. With only five 
aircraft available, we are flying more than that. We can clearly operate six 
aircraft at 50.0/hrs. /yr. /aircraft, We might be able to operate seven at that 
rate. We almost certainly couldn't operate eight at 500, If we assume., conser­
vatively, that a seventh aircraft would operate 400 hours and an eighth 300 hours, 
the question becomes, "how much avai.lability :do we want .to pay for? 11 
!:-\PUTS: 
f.'�: Cost increases associated with availability. 
x:::z.;�: Alternative ways of paying for availabUity. 
VOTE: 
a. 6 b. 7 c. 8 
I 
PROBLEM: It has been club policy (and probably will be in the future) to equip 
aircraft alike. Most of the group has indicated .a preference for glideslopes, 
and the cost discussions so far have included them. Others have discussed 
DME1s, radio-coupled auto-pilots (no. altitude hold), and encoding altimeters 
(to meet Group l TCA requireme1.ts starting 7/1/74). 
INPUT: 
��: Cost and uses of equipment, Increase in cost/hour. 
VOTE: 
Would you like to have the following equipment if it increased cost per huur by 
the following amounts? 
DME at about$ hour. 
Coupled autopilot at about $ ___ hour. 
Encoding altimeter at about $ ___ hour. 
7. SUMMAlW AND RECOMMENDATIONS TOBE MADE TO THE BOARD 
4. How many planes should be in the s econdary fleet?
5, What type of aircraft should our secondary fleet be? 
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The formulation of each of these agenda items was important to our 
purpose ,l Furthermor e,  the order in which they came up was, we
felt, crucial. 
We were afraid that the group would choose all cheap planes 
if given the opportunity. So, we structured the agenda to focus first  
upon a "primary" fleet. U our es timates were correct the vote would· 
go for a "primary fleet" of mos tly inexpens ive plane s, We used a 
Borda count rather than open balloting because we did not want the 
group to become aware of the pattern of controversy and thus vote 
more strategically. This secret ballot would also mas k  the fact that 
there was not much s entiment for Cessna. A member basically 
indiffe.rent on later votes might have been inclined against Ces snas 
if he thought few wanted them, On this ballot, we voted for all Cessnas 
in order to help fores tall any impress ion that Ces snas were unpopular, 
We figured many people wanted six four -seat planes (Es and 
Fs) and no six-seat planes .  The second stage of the agenda pitted all 
those people who preferred seven or more four -seat planes and all . 
individuals who preferred one of the mixed-fleet alternatives (who we c 
figured preferred seven-plane fleets ) against all those who wanted s ix 
four-seat plai;ies, 
The next question was, "Do we want a mixed fleet? 11 Here we 
were pitting all people who wanted �kind 0£ mb<:ed fleet against thos e  
who wanted all one kind. Our initial es timates led us  t o  think .that this 
was the critical vote. It was the one we were most worried about, 
'rhat is the reason that we pitted it against all other alternatives, It 
was also taken by a show of hands so it would give those who wanted 
mixed fleets (a possible minority) a chance to register the intensity 
of their preferences by debate and voting. As it turned out, nearly 
everyone was in favor of a mixed fleet and this item pas sed without 
even a formal vote. 
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,For the fourth question, "How .many planes in a secondary
fleet?" We figured that any coalition large enough to win the "mixed­
fleet" vote would be large enough to vote in at least two six- seat planes.  
This item did not appear on the formal agenda, but it  appeared in the 
context of the meeting and it was voted upon. 
The fifth question was the type of secondary plane . We 
figured that the high cost of maintaining a seven-plane fleet would 
make members especially sensitive to costs . Given that they were 
going to have such a big fleet, most would be in.•favor of of the cheapest 
of the secondary alternatives -- the Ces snas, 
The final question on avionic s equipment was held for last. 
The rates go up rapidly with additional equipment. 1f the members 
had voted in favor of lots of equipment at first, expenses would have 
been greater and the chances of getting them to choose a s;ven-plane
fleet would have been substantially reduced. 
Figure 3 outlines the basic structure of the agenda, There 
it can be seen as a succes s ive refinement of partitions.  By specifying 
each agenda choice and determining in what order the choices  shall be 
considered, one establishes a series of particular partitions . This 
partitioning is the focus of our analysis .  
The meeting was  held at  7:30 on September 20, 1 973  - - the 
same time at which Bobby Riggs was playing the well-publicized tennis 
match against Billy Jean King, Almost half of the members attended 
in spite of the conflict, We took this to be a good indicator of the 
strength wit� which opinions were held, Twenty-four members were 
present, 
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FIGURE 3 
Item 4*'� Item 5* 
no 
C ' s EEEFFF 
EEEFFC 
EEEFFA 
l-=::::::==�======-; EEEFFC
A'R EEEFFA 
b planes. 
no se condary 
fleet �-�1 
EEEFFFF ); 
EEEFFFC 
EEEFFFA 
EEEFFCC secon _ 
EEEFFAA ary  J 
fleet 
EEEFFFF 
EEEFFFC 
EEEFFFA 
EEEFFCC 
EEEFFAA 
Item 4'** 
EEEFFFC 
EEEFFFA 
EEEFFCC 
EEEFFAA 
*'.These item numbers correspond to the numbers on the original agenda, 
**The formal agenda listed only item 4 but it was understood (correctly) 
to mean that Iten1 4 was to be decomposed into two stages consis ting 
of items 4 and 41 , As it turned out no formal vote was taken on item 4 
because  there. was no sentiment expressed at all for a nonmixed fleet. 
The meeting s imply moved to consider item 4' directly . 
The meeting was conducted in accord with the agenda, The 
votes on the various items are recorded on figure 5 .- To re solve 
certain administrative difficulties arising out of the meeting, the 
club s ent a questionnaire to the members after the· meeting in·whi<::h 
they were as ked to rank a great number of the alternatives, We 
were fortunate to .get the results of the questionnaire because it 
allowed us to partially reconstruct the preferences which were held 
at the meeting. Thes e  are listed in figure 4. 
From the p;references on figure 4 we can conjecture 
(figure 5) about how each individual voted at the meeting. 
FIGURE 4 
RANKINGS OF ALTERNATIVES (WITH ONE INDEXING THE "BEST'') BY MEMBERS WH.O ATTENDED THE MEETING 
. � 
Individual Me..,.,her•, lndexerl by Nurnber R ather Th;,.n Name 
I I co I I l Alterna- i .. .!:: I " -"' Majority 0 c: tive "' rule 
fleet a 
16 , 17 "" orde r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 s 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 22 2 3  I ... 
EEEFFF 6 3 3 7 4+ -l 7 3 .5' I 4* 4* 2* 2* 5* 7 -1 4 4* 5* -1 l 4 
EEEFFC 7 I· 2 2 l + a I o l 3 2 4* 4* 2"' 2* 3 8 13 I 3 S* 2 4* 7 
EEEFFA 4 2 l 5 6+ 3 5 5 3 . 3t; 4* 4* l 2* 4 6 5* 5 4* I 5* s 3 3 
' 
EZEFFFF 5 4* 8 
3,, I 5T - 8 6 4t 3* 14* 4"' 2* 2* 5'• 3 J 5* 7 4'-' 5* 7 4* 2 
EEEFFFC 2 4* 5 6 3t 6 I 4 4 3 3* 2 2 2'' 2* 2 -l 2 I � 2 3 J -I'• 5 ' 
EEEFFFA I -l* 4 l 7t I t 3 6 ! 2 I 3* l 3 I I 2* 5,, I 5,, 6 -l* 1 -I 2 I -
EEEFFCC 3 4* 7 3 2 + 7 2 , I l .. I 3* i 3 l l 2•' 2�' I 5 l l l 2 1 4* 6 
EEEFFAA l 4* b 4 I gt I z l 6 2 3* 4* 4* l I 5•' 2 5'� 8 4* 4 6 4* 4 
* Individuals kft this hlank. All values w,•r.- as!1tmH'd to :ihow indiffcn•ncc and ranked at the bottom. 
24 
st 8 
6+ 4 
3t 6 
1t 7 
5t 3 
zt I 
4t 2 
1t s 
t These w.-r., left bl.1nk by tlH' 1ndi\"idual. The ntunbcrs w<'_rc filled in by us on the basis of ,·omn1cnts made 
by the indh•idual durini: th<' n><•etini: and on other occa�iont4 . We feel reasonably confident in our accuracy. 
..!' b c � 
� 0 ... ..... .>. .... .C:J :- ... :J <> 0 " ., .s ..... a � �-.'1J l 2 0 ... 
<> .,.o 
Six 6 6 x 
Seven 14 16 � 
* -
FIGURE 5 
Real Vote Totals on Agenda Items and Our Con3ect1.;rcs 
.Abo•.it Individual Votini.; Patterns {Marked by X) Based on Fii;•;re -1 
Question: De you want a 11iX-plane fie.et or a seven-piane fleet? 
Individuals and_conjectured individual votes 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 j 1s 16 17 
x did not x x * 
x !vote x x x x x �' x x 1 x x 
18 19 20 21 122 
x x 
x x x 
An�biguous on our c riteria. Counted him af. abstaining which was probably accurate since he was chairman. 
Question: Do '/OU want a one-plane secondary or two-plane secondary? 
b 
Individuals and conj&etured individual votes J:: ..!' .., ... ..... 
�,p .,.o..., .C.:J ., ".f! <>.8 
J ., 0 ;,,�.., l 2 3 4 s (, 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 " ... ... �f 
One 9 x * x x x * x * x x x 
Two 13. 12 * x x x x - x * x x x x x x 
•
Ambiguous on our criteria . 
- Question: Do you want C-210s or A-36s as the secondary fleet? 
..!' b Individuals and conjectured individual votes § � ..... � 0 .c:: .>.-.. . ., -.:: (,';' .8 " a �.8 �� l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ... 
00 !? 
C-ZlO! 10 11 * x t x )\ * x x x x x x x x "' 
�-36• 10 9 x * x t x x • x x x * 
• 
.Ambiguous on our criteria. 
t1..en the meeting. We conjecture he would have voted with the C-ZlO•. 
23 
x 
23 
x 
23 
x 
24 
x 
24 
x 
24 
x 
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As can be readily determined, the conjectured vote i s  very s imilar 
to the actual, The basis for the conjecture is very simple, We 
hypothes ized that the individual would vote for the s et which contains 
his mos� prefe rred alternative regardl�s s  of the other alternatives
in the set. This theory of individual voting behavior will be called 
the "sincere voting" strategy later in the paper and will be con7 
s idered along with some other decision rules .  
The votes went as follows: the basic flee.t was to  contain
Es and Fs; This was the outcome of the Borda count and conformed 
to our general expectations.  The vote was fourteen to six in favor of 
a s even-plane fleet; thirteen (a majority of those present) in favor of 
a two-plane secondary; and tied ten to ten between the C-21 0s and 
the A-36s as the type of s econdary. The group then was tied between 
our first choice of five four- s eat planes and two C - 2 1 0 s  and five 
four-seat planes and two A-36s .  Practically speaking, this was a 
victory for us s ince the board would choose the Ces sna alternative.  
From all indications, it  looked as though our approach had 
, 
worked, Several things happened which tended to reinforce this 
impres s ion. The chairman of the group was a strict A-36 man 
(number 1 3 on figure 4) and seemed to be uninhibited in his 
efforts to use the chair to change the agenda in ways that would 
influence the outcome to his advantage .  · Here are some of the
alternative agendas he attempted to use (of cour s e  we called him 
out of order, s ince our agenda had been adopted by the agenda com-
mittee): 
As soon as the introductory remarks were over and before 
any of the items on our agenda were on the floor, he called for a vote 
on: "Do we want an all-Bonanza [Beechcraft] fleet? II According to 
our theory this motion would unquestionably pas s and regard�e s s  o f  the
later items , the club would ha ye vote� for at least one A-36 and 
1 3  
probably two. His motion was ruled out of order. Then after the 
primary fleet was decided, but before the s ize of the fleet was voted 
upon, he asked: "Do we want A -3 6 s  or C-2 1 0 s  as a secondary fleet? 1 1  
Again, checking how the vote would have gone according to our theory 
we find that the group would have chosen A-36s  at this s tage. The 
. ultimate choice would have been a s even-plane fleet with one A-3 6 ,  
This would have occurred regardles s  o f  the wording of the later items, 
But he was ruled out of order. Then after we determined the fleet 
size but before the numbe r  of planes in the s econdary fleet was 
decided, he aske_d, "Do we want at least one A- 36? 1 1  The answer to 
this question would have been yes by a vote of thirteen to eight, We 
called his attention to' the fact that he had again deviated from the 
agenda and that his motion could not be taken as a substitute. 
The remarkable thing about this chairman's behavior is 
that agenda rigging is not easy business  - - for us at least. Ther e  
a r e  thousands of competing agendas. Yet h e  seemed to know which 
ones were to his advantage, Not once did he make a mistake, at least 
according to our theory. Could he have instinctively understood the 
theory which we had so laboriously arrived at? 
Another indication that the a'genda worked is that the Condorcet
winner (the s even�plane fleet with one A-36  secondary) got knocked 
out by a careful grouping of alternatives against it. · 
III. THEORY, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS 
Our basic theory �s s imple. The agenda influences outcomes 
in two ways . First, it limits the information available to individual 
decision makers about the patterns of preference in the group. The 
primary means available for preference r evelation is voting, and the 
content of each vote is specified by the form of the agenda, In some 
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settings , other means of preference revelation such as verbal communi­
cation and/or straw votes can be ruled "out of order" by strict adherence 
to an agenda and therefore provide a limited means for information 
generation. In other settings, where t�ere are many alternatives and 
many people, such activities may be of limited importance even when 
they are permitted. In addition, coordination of decisions among 
individuals through any type of binding agreement .is  nearly impos s ible' 
in most meetings . This generally precludes collusive behavior unles s  
it i s  the result of a pre-meeting meeting and, even then, to be effective 
the coalition would have to be very well informed about both the patterns 
of preference among the group and the agenda to be used, Thus,  each 
individual usually finds himself in a pos ition of decision making under 
uncertainty, and his behavior will be consistent with theories about 
decision making under uncertainty. His subjective probabilities about 
the actions of the g1•oup may range from favorable ("From any set, the 
group is likely to choose the thing I want most") to unfavorable ("From 
any s et, the group will always choose what I want least") ,  ,but aside
from such ''world views , "  the preferences of others will have limited 
opportunity to influence his behavior, 
Second, the agenda determines the set of strategies available 
to the individual, He always has the opportunity to choose among 
outcomes ,  but which outcomes he may cho�se among at any point is 
determined by the agenda. The individual always must pick the 
particular strategy he prefers from among those available, The 
agenda determines what set of strategies is available, So, by reducing 
the influence of others ' preferences and by determining the set of 
strategies available to him, the agenda effectively influences the 
voting pattei:n of each individual in the group. It thereby influences 
the choice made by the group. 
We are faced at this point wi.th a particularly interesting
problem of proof, We think that the agenda i.s a very important 
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parameter in determining the outcome of group decisions .  In addition 
we feel we have a rudimentary understanding of the principles which 
serve as the bases of this influence, These will be spelled out formally 
in the next section. However, we are not in a position to assert that 
the principles we use are the principles or that our formal statement 
. of them is entirely accurate - - we can (and do) demonstrate that they 
are not and it is not. 
How then can we make our point about the non-neutrality of 
the agenda? We could attempt to do so  empirically • . However, it  is 
hard to find ready-made examples like the flying club where we have 
a good grasp on preferences with one hand and can influence the agenda 
with the other, And the flying-club example is insufficient evidence by 
itself, since the result achieved could be explained by many competing 
hypotheses,  none of which could be discredited with available information.
To overcome thes e  objections,  we turned to experimental methods , 
To experiment convincingly, we first need a group of people 
involved in choosing jointly between alternatives that the participants 
individually really care about. The theory of induced preference 
developed by Smith [7] seems to solv� this problem. If an individual 
really cares about money and if the amount he is paid varies substantially 
with the alternative chosen by the group, and if side payments are not 
allowed, then we as sume that he really cares individually about the ' 
decision and that his preferences can be. ranked by his payoffs, 
Participants are not allowed to indicate in any way the magnitudes 
of  their own payoffs s ince this. information along with other aspects of  
the experimental s etting tends to  exert its own independent influence 
on preference s .  
second, we need t o  b e  able to repeat the process with the
agenda changed, ceteris paribus . Keeping other things constant 
tends to reas sure us that the influence of the agenda has been 
"measured. " Perhaps more important, the fewer the variables 
changed between experiments, the fewer the number of theories 
which might explain the differential ref!Ults, 
IV, THE MODEL 
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Our model has been developed to help us ·understand simplified 
committee processes  and the pos sible influence of the agenda within 
the context of our experimental des ign. Although we believe that 
what we have learned carries over to more complex environments, 
we focus here only on the laboratory s etting. 
A. The Agenda 
The form of agenda we used in resolving the flying club 
problem can be represented abstractly as a series of partitions ( into 
two sets) of the feasible set of alternatives . Each item on the agenda 
was des igned to eliminate some set  of alternatives from further con-
) sideration. Our experimental agendas were similarly constructed, 
We used the following example to explain the agenda to the 
experimental group during some of our experiment s .  Suppose that·· 
we are deciding what kind of banquet to give. ·The agenda reads: 
Item 1. Shall the dress  be formal o r  informal? Item 2. Shall the 
cuisine be French or Mexican? This agenda is modeled by the 
following diagram:· 
Item 
:Formal, French 
Formal, Mexican 
Informal, French 
Informal, Mexican 
Hem 2 
Formal, French 
Informal, French 
Informal, Mexican 
If the items had been r eversed in our example so that the 
vote was fir s t  on cuisine and then on attire, the agenda could be 
modeled as follows : 
Item 1 
Formal, French 
Informal, French 
Formal, Mexican 
. Infer mal, Mexican 
Item 2 
Formal, French 
Informal, French 
Formal, Mexican 
Informal, Me:dcan 
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Each item on the agenda is geared to eliminate some of the 
alternatives which have survived the previous votes .  This continues 
until a single alternative r emains which is the choice of the group. 
For a fixed set of alternatives the set of all agendas corresponds 
to the set of all such "trees, " where each "tree"  which can be formed 
from a given set of alternative s  repres ents a different agenda. 5 
B. Individual Preferences 
Call the set of alternatives O. We then assign to each 
individual, i, a function ui which assigns to each x E 0 a monetary , 
"payoff" which will be given to i in the event that x is chosen. This 
determines how much each separate individual will be paid (different 
individuals may receive different amounts) depending upon which 
alternative is chosen by the group. Side payments are not allowed 
and discussions from which one mi,ght determine the relative magnitude 
5. Is it always possible to represent a "tree" so that the corre­
sponding agenda presents a set of  choices the group will find acceptable 
or "natural"? We occasionally had to expend considerable effort  on 
the wording of the agendas we used and suspect that some r esults cannot 
be reached using a "natural"-appearing agenda, 
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of the payoffs are not allowed, Individual i will receive the amount 
ui(x) in the event that x is chosen by the group. He can receive no 
more than this ;  he can give none of it away; and he is the only member 
of the g,roup who knows the amount of his payoff, I£ he prefers more 
money to les s ,  we can induce in him a preference relation Ri over
n in accord with the procedure xR\ if and only if ui(x) :::_ u\y);
Following the procedure above we induce individual preferences 
over the set  of alternatives n. We wish to determine if there is any 
sys tematic relationship between the se fixed preferences, the agenda, 
and the final choice made by the group. 
C. Individual Voting Rules 
How does an individual choose among alternatives? What 
decision rules will he use? We have pos t:Ulated a universe of three 
different decis ion rules, 
No. 1. The sincere-voting hypothesis:  This hypothesis holds that 
an individual faced with two sets of alternatives will vote for the set  
which contains his mos t  preferred alternative. I£ he is indifferent 
between the two best alternatives he then decides on the basis of a 
comparison between the second ranked alternatives . I£ he is indiff.erent 
between the se two then we define the rule to be ambiguous, 6 
No. 2, The avoid- the-worst hypothesis: .Here the individual votes to 
avoid the alternative he likes the least. When faced with a choice 
between two sets, .he compares the least preferred alternative in each 
set and votes against the set which contains the wors t  of these two, 
The case of ties is treated similarly to the above, 
No, 3, The average value hypothesis: This hypothesis holds that the 
individual treats the group choice as a lottery that will choose any 
6 .  The hypothes is as firs t  developed by ·Farquhar.son• continues 
in the l.exicographic fashion, An ambiguity in his procedure ·can occur
when the s ets are of different sizes, · This was called to our attention 
by Steven Matthews . 
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alternative in a particular set  with equal probability. The choice 
between two sets is like a choice between two lotteries (with uniform 
.distribution over the outcomes )  and he chooses (votes for) the one with 
the higher expected value, Since the payoffs of these alternatives are 
in terms of money, the theory says he will choose the set with the 
highest average payoff, The case of ties is treated as in No. 1 above.
Clearly, these three decision rules do not exhaus t  the set  
of imaginable decision rules .  Any of them, for example, could 
be expanded to include the variance of the payoff in a set or to reflect 
attitudes toward risk, Any of them could be modified to include 
past decisions made by the group as well as subjective estimates 
of future decisions; Nevertheless ,  these rules form the back­
bone of our model, In the end we will concl�de that the model 
could stand improvement. Perhaps this is one of the places where 
improvement can be achieved. 
Our approach to the problem differs from that found in 
economics ,  We postulate the individual as a random variable over 
these decision rules, That is, we as experimenters do not know 
which rule he will use at a given point, but we are willing to speculate 
about the probability with which he will use a rule, In this "stochastic 
man" approach we are close to models which have had succes sful 
applications in marketing, Bass [2]. 
n 
a. 
Some notation is needed. 
the universal set  of alternatives, 
(Jl1, .JI 2, • , , , ·Jlrd is an agenda where
"!1 is a partition of n into two sets, 
.42 is  a partition of each partitionable set  of the two s ets 
of .J21 into two sets
.fk is a partition of each of the partitionable s ets of .llk-l 
into two sets,  
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the set of all individuals .  
ui(x) is the monetary payoff to individual i if alternative x is chosen,
i E I, x E O, 
..d;.s, S) 
' 
("'1•"'2•"'3' <:l'4, cr5,ci6,Ci7,o-8,a
'
9} = the set of "states " in 
which an individual may fin.d himself relative to two sets,
S and S, of alternatives ,  These are defined as follows,
Q' 1 = All decis ion rules dictate a vote for S over S; or one. 
(or.more) decision rule dictates.a vote for S and the 
- 7 
other two (er one) are ambiguous between S and S .  
Ci 2 All decision rules dictate a vote for S over S ;  or one 
(or more) decision rule dictates a vote for S and the 
other two (or one) are ambiguous between S and S .  
Cl7 
One decision rule dictates a vote for S ,  another dictates 
a vote for S, and the other is ambiguous between S and S;
or all three rules are ambiguous 
Decis ion rule number 1 dictates a vote for S and both 
number 2 and number 3 dictate a vote f9r S. 
Decision rule number 2 dictates a vote for S while 
both rules numbe r  1 and number 3 dictate a vote· for S.
� Decision rule number 3 dictates a vote for S while both 
number 1 and number 2 dictate a vote for S. 
Both decision rules number l and number 2 dictate a 
vote for S while number 3 dictates a vote for S, 
Both decision rules number l and number 3 dictate a vote 
for S while number 2 dictates a vote for S. 
7, Ambiguity can occur if the quantity of importance i s  the same for 
both s ets . If the individual was indifferent between his best alternative . 
in S and his best alternative in S, then no, l would be ambiguous ,  If
the indivi:dual was indifferent between his wors t  element in S and the 
wor s t  element in S, then no. 2 would be ambiguous.  If the average payoff
in both sets was the s ame, then no. 3 is ambiguous •. 
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"'9 Both decision rules numbe r  2 and number 3 dictate 
a vote for S while number l dictates a vote for S. 
Pi (S, Sj Q, O'k) the probability that individual i will vote for the set S 
over the set  S given that thE\y are imbedded at some
s tage in agenda a and that he finds himself in the 
situation described by Cl k' 
· Axiom 1: Independence From Environment.
The probability function Pi (S, Sjct k' • ) are par
.
ameterized only 
by Q' k and for all s, s•' Pi(S, slC( k) = Pi(S ' ,  S' IQ' k). 
This means that the individual does not act s trategically by anticipating
upcoming votes ; his probability of voting is not affected by previous
votes; l).is probability is not affected by discus s ion at any s tage of the
meeting, set s izes, set labels , etc, It is as though he always uses one of
the decisi<m rules above, and he chooses from among them with fixed, · 
probabilities,
Axiom 2: Stochastically Identical Individuals 
P. (S, 'S'/crk) = P.(S, sj o-k) for all i, j, S, S, k.1 J • 
This axiom postulates a certain similarity among individuals, It says 
that the probability that any individual votes "yes " when he finds him�elf 
in any given situation is the same for anyone who finds himself in that 
�ame s ituation, In addition, this axiom declares that the univer s e  of 
parameters on the probability distribution is exhausted by the situations 
enumerated above , 
D. The Strength of S against S 
Suppose the voting rule is majority rule and that in the agenda 
the set S has been pit,ted against the set S. What is the probability that
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S will win? This probability will be called the strength of S against S. 
This can be calculated as follows, 
(1) 
V(S, S,<¥ k) = the set of people who find themselves in s ituation
Q'k; Q'kE,ei(S,S) • .
.l[v(S,S,Cl'k)ll = the number of people in the set V. 
9 
n =the total number of people (note:  :E.jjV(S,S,Q'k)ll nJ.k=l 
W = {<x1, • • •  , x9): O :-:: xk :5 jjv(S,S,cik) jj, .xi E integers V�, 
P((s,s» 
n� 
9 rn + 1 :f . dd l .!'.: -2-- i n is o } :E x i=l i > L� if n is even • 
the probability that the set S receives a majority 
vote over the set  S in a contest between the two. 
P((S,S)) = 
9 
E Il 
w k=l 
That this is the appropriate probability can be s een by application 
of the binomial probability distribution, the' independence as sumptions and the 
appropriate area of summation. Notice that all we need to know to 
calculate this numb�r is the number of people in each set V 
and the nine probability numbe:i:s repres ented by P(S, S jQ' k), .
k :: 1,, • •  , 9,
E. Strength of an Agenda, 
We turn now to the model of primary interest. What agenda 
is mos t  likely 'to yield a given alternative x as the group's choice?  
We answe.r this question by calculating the strength of  an agenCla !or 
2 3  
an alternative x.  We do  this by first calculating the probability under a 
given agenda that x will be the group's choice. With that formula in 
hand, we can then survey all pos sible agendas (which is. incidentally 
no s imple problem) to find the one which maximizes the chance of 
getting x, 
Consider the agenda 0. = (.J. , • . .  , .,1. ), We as sume 1 m . 
there are m items . Each item, ..f , you recall, partitions each set' k ' 
. in ,Rk-l into two set s .  'T'he original s et, ,P0 = n is the set of all 
alternatives , Now s ince the items of the agenda partition sets, 
each element x E n appears in one and only one set S at any given item. 
Gall this set S(x, .,ek) and the set which is pitted against it S(x,.,�°kJ· 
Our previous. formula ( 1 )  allows us to state the probability
P((S(x,J\)• S(x,,IJ<.)? ) for any given x and any given,£k, From the
independence axioms above we know immediately then that: 
(1) 
(2) 
P(x j(A) = the probability that x is chosen by a group given 
that the agenda is a. 
This is the formula we were seeking at the beginning. 
F. Influencing the Group 
In order to apply the theory we face three more problems.  
The first involves obtaining estimates of the nine numbers P(S, S jQ' k) ,
k = 1 ,  , • •  , 9 .  The numbers we used were estimated from the pilot 
experiments and are provided in section VII. 
The second problem involves the interesting mathematical 
problem �£ finding the qptimum agenda. For each alternative we can
compute the probability that it will win under any given agenda, Choice 
of an agenda then will be like the choice of a lott�ry so in general 
the "best" agenda would depend upon attitudes toward risk, etc, 
The objective function we use simply dictates finding the Q.. which
maximizes P(x jQ.) .  The hard part occurs .because of the very large 
number bf potential a. 
24 
Third, we mus t  be able to get the group to adopt and adher e  to 
the agenda we have chos en, This involves devising an agenda which 
presents choices in an acceptable or "natural" way and preventing 
alternative motions from reaching the floor. 
V, PILOT EXPERIMENTS 
We conduc ted three series of pilot .experiments prior to the 
series used to es tablish the propositions we wish to report here as 
final res earch results, There were nine pilot experiments in all 
(six in s eries one, one in series two, and two in series three) and 
from them we obta ined two types of information: first, we es timated 
the probabilities P(S, S jCl' ), to be used for the experiments, Second , k l 
we learned a lot about experimental design in general and our pro-
cedures in particular.  We describe the pilot results here. The reader 
interested only in our final results should s kip directly to the next ' 
section. 
The experimental environm�nt was not as closely controlled 
during the pilot experiments as it was for the final (fourth) series,  
Slight variations ii::i instructions occurred. Profes sor Plott chaired 
the meetings and might conceivably have affected the outcome of the 
votes, 8 The pilot experiments were not at first  designed for any
8. Among the several ways this might have occurred: once
several revotes were taken when it was clear that a particular indi­
vidual was �onfused and was not giving a clear s ignal (hand going up 
and then down) as to which way he was voting. Sometimes motions 
were written on the board in differing ways . The chairman, who 
knew the desired outcome, might pos s ibly have communicated approval 
or disapproval of an alternative by inflection� exp_ression, or choiceof words . 
well-specified purpose,  but rather (especially in series 1 )  s imply 
attempted to replicate the flying club experience.  Occasionally 
an experimental design itself caused problems . Aside from these 
defects, however, the overall design of the pilot experiments was 
very similar to the one used in s eries 4 .  Individuals (students 
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from Pasadena City College, U .  C. L. A . , U. S .  C. and Caltech) 
were asked to participate in a decision-making experiment and 
were told that they would be paid. Preferences were induced on 
an abstract set of objects, An agenda was provided. The group then 
f h 
. . t 9 discussed the items within the constraints o t e experimen • 
A. Series One 
Preferences induced for Series One are shown on figure 6. 
1 0 Note the s imilarities with the flying club example .  The Series One 
sequence consisted of six experiments in all. Figures 8 through 10 
. report the structure of the agendas , the probabilistic predic tions of 
the model (computed from the data from this series), the actual vote 
count at meeting, and the resulting choice made by the group. Figure 
7 provides the key to the figure s .  Each agenda reported here was 
designed to get some particular alternative, The model used was a 
s implified version of the one we later adopted and report above. 
These agendas are not optimal according to either model, The 
exception is the agenda used for series one, experiment six, which, 
was found by the computer and is optimal according to the original 
model. 
9, There could be no :.-iention of monetary rewards,  There could be 
no side payments and no threats of ac tions external to the experimental 
setting. The agenda must be followed, etc .  
10.  With the F,  C, A letters repres enting types of aircraft, th.e agendas 
are the same after the choice of basic fleet type. The following pairs (x, y) 
where x represents the person in figure 6, and y represents a person in 
figure 4 have identical orderings : (1, 4), (2, 1 2 ),  (3,  1 8),  (4, 21  ) ,  (5, 1 ), 
(6, 8), (7, 9 ), ( 8, 13 ) ,  ( 1 0, or 7), The other preferences were changed in 
a manner which would help us identify some of the pos s ible decision rules 
participants used, 
, 
PERSON 
- 1 
2 .
3 
4 
5 
6
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
n 
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
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1 7  
1 8  
. 1 9  
FIGURE 6 
SERIES 1 ,  PAYOFFS IN DOLLARS 
A LTERNATIVE 
FFA 
FFF FFC FFA FFFF FFFC 1 z 3 4 5 
o. so  6 . 00 1 .  00 o .  2.5 o.  7 5
o. 2.5 o. 2.5 o. 2.5 o.  2.5 5 . 0 0
0. 5 5  8 . 00 0. 49 0. 40 7. 8 0
3 . 8 0  7. 5 0  3 . 50 0. 90 4 . 0 0  
3 . 00 2. 00 5 . 00 4 . 00 7. 0 0  
6 . 00 8 . 00 4. 00· 3 . 00 5 . 0 0  
4. 00 6. 00 6. 00 5 , 00 6. 0 0
1. 00 I .  00 8 . 00 I .  00 I .  00
2 . 0 0  1 .  0 0  3 . 00 5 . 00 4. 0 0
2 . 0 0  3 . 00 4 . 00 2. 00 5. 0 0  
1 .  0 0  7. 5 0  7. 40 2. 00 2. 0 0  
2 . 00 8 . 00 2. 00 7. 00 6. 0 0  
7. 00 6 . 00 s. oo 7 . 00 I .  00
3 . 0 0  2. 0 0  2 . 00 7 . 00 I .  0 0  
1 .  00 7. 00 7 . 00 2 . 00 2 . 0 0  
7. 00 7 . 00 1 .  00 2. 0 0  3 . 00 
1 .  00 2 . 00 8 . 00 7 . 0 0  3 . 00 
7 . 0 0  7, 00 6 . 00 8 . 00 s. oo 
7. 0 0 7. 00 6 . 00 1. 00 l .  00 
Majority Rule Relation 
FFF A (Experiments 3 and 4 )  
F F C  (Experiment 5) 
FFCC (Experiments l and 2� 
,J FFAA (Experiment 6) 
"' FFFC 
FFFF 
FFF 
FFFA 
6 
8 . 00 
4 , 50 
0. 45
3 . 8 0  
8 , 00 
3 . 00 
7. 00
8 . 00 
8 . 00 
6 . 00 
8 . 00 
s . oo 
8 . 00 
8 . 00 
8 , 00 
3 . 00 
7. 00
s. oo
8. 00
FFCC FFAA 
7 8 
5 . 5 0  5 . 00 
8 . 00 0 . 2 5  
7. 90 0 . 29
8 . 00 1 .  00 
6 , 0 0  8 . 00 
7 . 00 3 , 00 
8 . 00 7 . 00 
l. 00 8 .  oil
6 . 00 7 . 00 
7. 00 8 . 00 
7 . 00 6 . 00 
1 .  00 7. 00 
2 . 00 3 . 00 
7. 00 6 .-00
4. 4 0  3 . 60 
2 . 00 8 .  00 
6. 0 0  s . oo
l . OQ 6. 00
6 . oo s . oo
I 
FIGURE 7 
(x) . means that x i s  the s treng th of the s e t  over its complement a s  
� determine d by the model. 
(x) <= means that x is the s treng th of the agenda in ge t ting this 
alternative. Each agenda was designed to get the a lt e rnative 
so marked. 
m xy . means that a t  this s tage the vote went "our way" by a vote of x to y. 
l>v.· means that at this stage we "lost" by a vote o{ x to y. Y? 
* i ndicates the actual iinal choice made by the group.
FFF - 1 
FFC - 2 
F FA - 3
F FFF - 4  
F F F C - 5 
FFFA - 6  
FFCC - 7  
FFAA · B  
FFF · l  
F F C  - 2  
FFA - 3  
Ff'FF - 4  
F F F C  - 5  
FFFA - 6  
FFCC - 7  
FFAA - 8  
FIGL'RE gt 
SERIES l - Experiment l 
,, 
FFF 
FFF 
FFC FFC 
F FA FFA 
F F F F  FFFF 
FFFC FFFC 
F F FA FFFA FFCC FFCC 
FFAA FFAA 
SERIES 1 - Expe riment 2 
Expnitn<'nt  I a nd l :  Agt• nda 
. 9 7 
FFFC 
F FFA 
FFCC 
FFAA 
1 .  Sha l l  the s e lection be a three letter alternative o r  a four letter alterna tive? 
.2. Sha ll t he s l' l .,ction be a mixed letter alternative? 
J .  l {  the s e l e c ti on· i s  t o b e  a four letter, mixed letter alternative, then shall 
it have two F ' s  or three F ' s ?
4 .  Shall the alternative have a C or an A? .  
t For key .aee figure 7. 
,64) <= 
F!Gt.:RE 9t 
SERIES I - Experiment 3 
FFFF 
FFFF FFCC 
FFFF - 4  FFCC 
F F C C  - 7 FFFC 
FF,FC - 5  FFAA FFFC 
F FAA FFAA - 8 FFFA 
FFFA FFF.A - 6  
FFF - 1  
FFC - 2  FFF 
FFA - 3  FFC 
FFA 
SERIES l - Expe r i ment 4 
F FFF - 4  
FFCC · 1  
F F F C - 5  
F FAA · 8  
FFFA - 6  
FFF · l  
FFC -2 
FFA - 3  
Serif's I Expn iment 3 and 4 :  Agenda 
1 .  Sha l l  the s e lection be a three letter or a four letter alte rnative ? 
2 ,  From the (four} (three)  letter alterna tive s ,  shall the decision be from the 
' fir s t  two or the r e mainde r ?  
J ,  1 £  only two alterna tives remain, which shall be  chosen? If more than two 
remain, shall the decis ion be from the firs t two or the remainder? 
t For key aee figure 7 
F F F  - 1  
FFFC - 5  
FFFA - 6  
FFCC - 7 
F F FF - 4 
FFA - 3  
, FFAA - 8  
FFC - Z  
FIGURE lot 
SERIES I - Expe r iment 5 
-FFF 
F FF C  r-==-· 
FFFA 
FFCC 
FFFF 
FFA 
F FAA 
FFC 
F F C C  
F F F F  
FFA 
FFAA 
FFC 
Serie s I Expe riment 5: Agenda 
FFAA 
FFC 
l. From these alte rnatives do we want one with a t  lea s t  three but no more
than three F ' s ?
Z .  D o  w e  want a fou r  letter alte rnativ� which contains three or more F ' s  or a C ?  
3 .  · D o  w e  want only one A ?  
SERIES l - Experiment 6 
FFC 
F F C  - Z FFFF 
FFF - l 
F FA - 3 
FFFC - 5  FFF 
F FCC - 7  FFA 
FFAA - 8  FFFC FFA I ;!- 7 
FFFA - 6  v F FC C  FFFC 
FFFF - 4  F FAA FFCC 
FFFA FFAA 
Series I Expe riment 6: Agenda * 
FFFC 
FFCC 
FFAA 
l .  Shall we a dopt o ne o f  the two extremes o r  e limina te them both? 
FFFC 
F FCC 
Z. , Of tho s e  r e ma i ning s hall  w e  adopt one of the two extremes or elimina.te 
thi;m both? 
· 
3. 0 (  thos e  rema ining s h a l l  we adopt t h e  t o p  alte rna tive?
4,  O f  thos e  r e ma ining s hall we adopt t h e  bottom a lternative ? 
5. W hich o f  the two remaining shall we adopt?
• T his age nda was gene rated by the computer.
t For key s e e  figur e  7.
FIGURE 11 
SERIES Z, PAYOFFS IN DOLLARS 
A LTERNATIVE 
T YLE LEPS YEPO TUPO TYLS 
PERSON 1 z 3 4 5 
1 3 ; 75 5 . 5 0  3 . 0 0  5 ,  2.5 o. 2 5
z 3 .  75 5 . 5 0  3 . 0 0  5 , 25 O .  ZS 
3 3, 75 5 , 50 3 . 0 0  5 . 25 o. 25
4 3, 75 5 . 5 0  3 . 0 0  5 , 2 5  o. 2 5
5 3 .  75 5 . 5 0  3 , 0 0  5 . 2 5  o. 2 5
6 3 . 75 5 , 5 0  3 . 0 0  5 . 2 5  0 . 2 5
7 3 . 75 5 , 5 0  3 . 00 5 , 2 5  o.  2 5
B 3 ,  75 5 .  50 .3 . 00 5 . 2 5  o. 2 5
9 7 . 5 0  4. 00 B . 0 0 7. 25 o. 25
1 0  7 . 5 0  4 , 00 8 . 00 7. 2 5 0. 2 5
1 1  7 . 5 0 4. 00 8 , 00 7. 25 o. 2 5
1 2  7 , 5 0  4 . 00 8.  00 7 . 2 5  o. 2 5
1 3  7 .  5 0 4. 0 0  8 . 0 0 7 .  25 o. 25
1 4  7 .  5 (1  4, 0 0  8 . 0 0  7 .  2 5 o. 2 5
1 5  7. 5 0 4 .  00  8 . 00 7. 25 o. 25
1 6  7, 5 0  4, 00 8.  00 7. 25 o. 25
1 7  7 .  5 0  . 4. 00 8 . 00 1. 25 o. 2 5
1 8  7 . 00 7. 5 0  6 . 2 5 !l,  00 o. 2 5
1 9  8 . 0 0  8 ,  2 5  7. 0 0  6 . 00 o. 25
20 8 , 00 7. :.o 6. 75 5. i:i o. 2 5
2 1  8 , 0 0  7. 5 0  6. 7 5 s. 75 o. 25
Majority 1 s t  Znd 3rd 4 th 5th 
rule ordering 
In the fir s t  two experiments in this s eries (experiments 1 
and 2), the same agenda was used (in abstract form) as was u s ed 
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by the flying club, The outcome of both meetings was the alternative 
we predjcted. 
Exper iments 3 and 4 used identical agendas (different from 
the one u s ed for 1 and 2) des igned to get the Condorcet winner FFFA. 
The fir s t  vote of experiment 3 did not go as we predicted even though , 
our model claimed a • 91 probability. We believe 'thi s  occurred
because a' s traw vote was taken. Our model makes no allowances 
for s traw votes, and our rules do not prohibit them. 
Of the remaining alternativ e s ,  only FFC and FFAA yielded 
agenda with "rea sonable" strength according to our fir s t  model, The 
agenda for experiments five and six were des igned to get each respec­
tively, As shown in figure 1 0 both meetings proceeded as expected. 
The fir s t  s ix expe riments ( Series One ) yielded a great deal 
of data on individual voting behavior, Thes e  data were then used to 
e s timate the probability numbers (reported in s ection V II) needed for . I 
the model outlined above.  With the s e  i.n hand, we decided that the first 
task would be to demonstrate that within a laboratory environment 
the agenda can sys tematically influence a gr oup ' s  decis ion. Both 
the following two series began as attempts to provide such a demon­
s tration but wer e aborted because of inadequacies in experimental 
des ign. 
The payoffs of Series Two were constructed so that we could, 
theoretic ally, get four out of the five alternatives with very high 
probability and demons trate theoretically that it was impos s ible (using 
the agenda alone as a parameter) to get the fifth. The payoffs , agenda 
and agenda strengths are shown on figure 1 1 .  The s e  agenda s tr engths 
w e r e  c alculated on the basis of data obtained in s er ie s  one. 
SE.RIES 2, ACENI>AS 
Jtcm 
lnumbcr Item Statement ' Pr(TL\'El = . 89 ] Pr{LEPS} > • 94 1 Pr(YEPO) = • 94 1 Pr(TUPO) 
--
Do we wa:at to consider Curthcr 
onl)" those alterr..:1.tives which 
contain a ".J. or do we want to I x1 • S  I con'-idc r lurth1: r 01!.l y tho:i c '"i " T I '"i " L I x1 a p  
&lternatives that do not cc.ntain � :-i.? 
or the alternatives remaining. 
do W<" want to considc.r further 
2 I only those .alt.,rnati....-e� th::i.t I x2 = Y  I x2 :a- L I .x2 11: T I :it2 :r E ::::�:: fJrt�:::�; �::te to 
alternatives that do not contain ·a. �? 
0£ tho:se alt.,rnativcs r�m:..inini::, 
do we WAt\t the alternative which 
3 I contains a � or do we w.i.nt the I x3 = T I x3 z S I �3 = s I x.3 r S alternative which does not con-
t:tln a !J..? · 
FIGURE.. 1 2t 
:.SERIF..S 2 - Experime�t . l 
(Number s  c orres pon
_
d TYLE TLYE - 1
TYLS to numbers in exper1- LEPS - 2  ments of Series 3 . )
TYLS - 5  
LEPS YEPO - 3 
YEPO TUFO - 4
TUFO 
* Us ing Series l frequency .data only from P C C  instead of pooled data , this 
probability becomes . 14 ! T his exp eriment was run at PCC. 
t For Rey s e e  figure 7 
3 0  
3 1  
This series was terminated after the firs t  experiment ( the 
results of which are recorded on figure 1 2) for three reasons . First, 
the participants of this experiment seemed confused. We thought 
that the labeling may have been partly responsible , This could have 
been remedied, but that would have involved a change in instructions 
and experimental procedures which would have been equivalent to 
terminating the serie s ,  Second, we had decided to use a "neutral" 
chairman who was not aware of the purposes of the experiment; This 
was his fir st  experience ,  so the meeting did not go especially smoothly. 
Third, · we felt the payoffs for some alternatives were so close that 
some subjects may have been indifferent. Greater differentiation would 
assure us that the preferences were thos e  we wanted to induce .  
Our concern was a product o f  the fact that the strengths o f  these  
agenda are very sens itive to the probability parameters we used, 
The des ign of Series Thr ee was essentially that of Series Two 
(the payoffs in Series Three were affine transformations of those in 
Series Two) except for one maj or exception which proved disastrous,  
For the first  time in any of our work we adopted an artifical s cenario. 
' 
Subjects were told that they were at a meeting of chocolate pizza manu-
facturers who were deciding among competing advertising programs, 
The payoffs {listed here in figure 1 3) in their ins tructions were to 
be taken to be the profits that would accrue to them individually from 
the institution of the various progr·ams (see the instructions in 
appendix I) . These changes were made in order to facilitate group 
discussion and to make the setting more "realistic" along certain 
dimensions,  
The s eries was aborted after the first  two experiments ( the 
results are in figure 1 3 ),  We discovered after the second experiment 
that many individuals thought we were trying to learn something about 
advertising 6trategies and completely ignored the payoffs in order to 
help. us out.. The scenario apparently called their attention to the 
experimental setting and encouraged the subjects to speculate on its 
3 2  
purpose,  In addition s ome subjects indicated strong favorable o r  
unfavorable reactions t o  some alternatives regardless o f  their payoffs . 
Since we no longer could b.e certain of the subjects 1 preferences we .could
not expect the models to work. For some examples, 
see the las t page in Appendix I .  The difficulties might be worth elimina­
ting in future experiments designed to test  the practical limHations 
of our theory, but to establish the basic hypothesis,  we adopted the 
design used in Series Four . It is this design that is reported in detail 
in the next section. 
FIGURE 13t 
SERIES 3 ,  PAYOFFS IN DOLLARS 
ALTERNATIVE 
A B .  D E c 
PERSON I z 3 4 s 
I s. 75 8. 5 0  4, 7 5  8. Z S  0. 25 
z s. 7S 8. so 4 ,  75 8, 25 0 .  25 
3 s. 7S 8, so -4, 75 8, 25 0, ZS 
4 5, 75 8, 50 4 .  75 8. ZS 0. ZS 
s s. 75 8. 50 4 .  75 8. 25 0, 25 
6 s, 7S 8. 50 4. 7S s. 25 0. 25 
7 s. 7S 8, 50 4. 75 8, Z5 o. 25 
8 5, 75 8. 50 4 .  75 8, 25 o. 25 
9 7. 50 4. 00 B. 00 7. ZS 0, 25 
10 7. 50 4 .  00 8. 00 7. 25 0, ZS 
I I  7. 50 4. 00 8, 00 7. 25 0, 25 
I Z  7. 5 0  4 .  00 8. 00 7. ZS o. zs 
1 3  7 .  50 4. 00 8, 00 7. Z5 o. zs 
1 4  7 .  s o  4. 0 0  8 .  0 0  7. ZS 0, 25 
lS 7, 50 4. 00 8. 00 7. ZS o. 25 
1 6  7.  5 0  4 ,  00 8, 00 7. 25 0, 25 
1 7 7. so 4 .  00 8. 00 7, 25 0, ZS 
1 8  7. 0 0  7, 50 6, ZS 8, 00 o. 25 
19 8. 00 8. zs 7. 00 6. 00 O. ZS 
20 s. 00 7, s o  6, 7S s. 75 0, ZS 
Zl 8, 00 7.50 /,, 7S s. 7S o. zs 
Majority l o l  Znd 3rd 4th 5th rule order 
SERIES 3 � Experiment l SERIES 3 • Experiment Z 
t For key seo figure 7 
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VI, EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
Our subjects were college students r ecruited from Caltech, the 
University of Southern California and the University of California at Los 
Angeles ,  An announcement was made in classes  about the opportunity 
to par ticipate in a "decis ion-making experiment. " They were told 
that they would attend a meeting which would last approximately an 
hour, discus s some is sue which had no. political overtones and that 
they would· have the oppor tunity to make "well over the hourly wage 
which any of them might be receiving . 11 They were told that the 
experimenter s  were interes ted in certain logistical and technical 
problems about group decision proces s e s ;  that ther e was no inter est 
in psychological variable s or pers onal variables;  and that they would 
be subject to no harm or embarras sment, 
Meetings took place in a classroom beginning at noon. 
As participants arrived they were assigned to seats in accord with 
a function which r esulted from a random number table. When all 
participants were s eated, they were asked to read the inst:r;uctions 
which had been placed fac e  down on their des ks , 
The instructions wer e  read by the experimenter1 1who did not 
know at the time which alternative the agenda was designed to produce,  
Thes e  are included here as appendix II ,1 2  After r eading the instruc ­
tions the experimenter answered any ques tions,  turned the meeting over 
to the chairman and s eated himself at the back of the room, He said 
nothing during the remainder of the experiment except when voting 
took place. He then stood up and recorded votes,  
1 1 .  Somethnes there were two experimenter s  pres ent. Only one 
ever read the instructions or otherwise spoke before the group. 
1 2 .  Note the wording of the agenda was exactly the same for the 
firs t  two and it was the same for the last two. The reason is because 
the index of any alternative varied between experiments. Thus the 
alternatives which were labeled B were numbered 3, 2, 5, and 5 for 
experiments one, two, three, and four respectively. 
The chairman for Series 2 ,  3, and the final Series 4 was a 
Caltech s enior majoring in physic s ,  He was paid $4. 00 per 
3 4  
hour, He was given the i�structions labeled "chairman' s instructions "  
in the appendix, He was not told the purposes  of the experiment o r  that 
we had any expectations about which alternatives the group might 
choose,  In the debriefing which occurred after the final experiment, i t
was evident that he did not  know the purposes of the experiments and did
not suspect that the agenda was a key variable. 1 3
The only person present during the experiment who was 
aware of which alternative was ,  theoretically, suppos ed to occur was 
the graduate r es earch assis tant, Steven Matthews. He was introduced 
along with the chairman, as a recording sec retary. The only things 
he said duri°ng the meetings were functional to the general task of 
recording vote s ,  
The chairman's  first  task was t o  go through the agenda. He 
proceeded in three steps. Fir st ,  he explained an abstract example
(see his instructions in the appendix; also see th e figure at p. 24 above)
of how an agenda operates .  This example , which involved the choice of
a banquet, and the real agenda were put on the chalkboard before the
experiment and remained there after he was finished. He then went
through the details of the agenda to be used during the meeting, answering
all q11estions relating to procedures,  Finally he ins tructed participants to
answer the questions on the las t  page of their instructions . When they
had finished, he then went through the "test" to see if anyone had answers
which "differed from his ,  1 1  i . e . , were wrong.
1 3 ,  When told the purpose of the experiments , he responded, 
"I never thought of the agenda as the point of the experiments,  I 
realized the s ame basic tree was used throughout, hut I do not under­
s tand how the outcome could be predicted reliably even knowing the 
payoffs , 11 He had chaired s even experimental meetings , 
3 5  
This last feature we found to be very useful, On several 
occas ions during our pilot experiments we had reason to suspect 
that participants did not fully understand the agenda and/or motions, 
After we adopted this test, mistak,,s seldom occured. 
After the procedures had been fully discussed, the meeting 
began, The chairman took up the first  item on the agenda and opened 
the floor for discussion , We asked him to encourage discussion 
on the fir st item, Participants t ended 'to b e  a little hesitant to speak
up ( " What can I say about an A ? "), but once discus sion started, they 
often were moved to comment on something, 
After the first item was voted upon, the group considered the 
next item on the agenda. On two or three occasions sorneone asked if 
items could be changed, This was not allowed. We suspect that 
certain types of straw votes are effectively changes in the agenda and 
may affect outcomes. Although we never prohibited a straw vote, we 
were prepared to rule one out of order if it was put in the form of a 
substitute agenda; e. g. , "If it comes down to box A versus box B later, 
how many will go for A ?1 1 We did allow one straw vote in lhis series 
and we think it did affect the outcome (see p. 36) ,  
When the meeting was over, all subjects were paid in cash 
the amount dictated by their payoff sheet and the alternative chosen 
by the group. There were never any complaints , 
V II. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. The Influence of the Agenda 
The payoff schedules used are listed on Figure 14. The 
majority rule r elation is also shown there.  Alternative No. 1 beats 
all others in any binary contest and alternative No, 5 is  beaten 
(unanimously) by any of the others in a binary contest. The other 
three alternatives are involved in a cycle. We would have preferr ed ' 
to avoid this cycle, however we were unable to find a noncyclic example for 
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which a probability one agenda could be constructed according to our 
model for each feasible14 item, given the probabilitie s  measured
f . l 1 5rom series  • Our experience with the last two s eries had taught
us not to take chances,  'W e  chose  the less "jazzy" ordering in order 
to get a better probability for the r esult we wanted, 
The results of the se experiments are in Figu res 1 5  and 1 6 . 
Experiments 1 ,  3, and 4, which were designed to get alternatives 3, 2 
and 1 respectively, performed exactly as anticipated, Each re sulted in 
the choice of alternatives for which the agenda was designed, 
The agenda for Experiment 2 was des igned for alternative 4 ,  
but the group chose alternative l,  This re sulted because a straw vote 
r evealed the fact that alternative 5 (labeled D in this experiment) was 
least prefyrred by all individuals, Does this call into ques tion the 
basic as sumptions of our n1odel.? We think not. This straw vote, we 
claim, e ffectively changed the agenda to the one on the figure labeled 
"Alternate Specification : Series 4 - Experiment 2. " For this alternate 
agenda the model predicts letter E, the one actually chosen, w ith a ,93 
probability. Suppose now we have only two theories : 
The outcome of the process does not depend upon 
the agenda, That i s ,  there exists a probability 
distribution P ( x )  over outcomes XE n which is 
� functionally dependent upon the agenda , although 
it may depend on other parameter s ,  
The outcome of the process does depend upon the 
agenda, That ls,  there exists a probability 
distribution P ( x  I Cl) over outcomes x E O  which 
i s • functionally d ependent upon the agenda in 
. 
addition to other parameters.  
14, Alternative 5 is  impossible, 
1 5; The probabilities P(S, S j o.. ) as measured from ser ies  l are : l 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
• 96 . 04 • 50 . 38 . 1 7 • 6 1 . 3 9 • 83 . 62 
3 7, 
Figur e ·  14 
SERIES 4,  PA YOFFS IN DOLLARS 
A LTERNATIVE 
PERSON 1 2 3. 4 5 
1 6 . 0 0  7 . 0 0  5 . 0 0  8 . 0 0  o : 5 o  
2 6 . 0 0  7 . 0 0  5 . 0 0  8 . 0 0  0 . 5 0  
3 6 . 0 0  7 . 0 0  5 . 0 0  8 . 0 0  0 . 5 0  
. 4 6 . 0 0  7 . 0 0  5 . 0 0  8 . 0 0  0 . 5 0  
5 6 . 0 0  7 . 00  5 . 0 0  8 . 0 0  0 .  5 0  
6 6 � 0 0  7. 0 0  5 . 0 0  8 . 0 0  0 . 5 0  
7 7 . 5 0  7 . 75  6 . 75  5 . 75 0 . 25 
8 7 . 5 0  7 . 75  6 . 7 5  5 . 75  0 . 25 
9 7. 5 0  7 . 75 6 . 75  5 . 75 0 . 25
1 0 7 . 5 0  7 . 7 5  6 . 75  5 . 75  o .  25  
1 1 7 . 5 0  7 . 0 0  6 . 0 0  8 . 0 0  0 . 5 0
1 2 8 . 0 0  7 . 5 0  7 . 0 0  6 . 0 0  0 . 5 0  
1 3  8 . 00  7 . 5 0  7 . 0 0  6 . 0 0  0 . 5 0  
1 4  8 . 0 0  7 . 5 0  7 . 0 0  6 . 0 0  0 . 5 0  
1 5  7. 0 0  5 . 5 0  7. 5 0  6 . 5 0  0 . 2 5
1 6 7 . 0 0  5 . 5 0  7 . 5 0  6 . 5 0  0 . 2 5
1 7 7 . 0 0  5 . 5 0  7 . 5 0  6 . 5 0  0 . 25
1 8 7 . 0 0  5 . 5 0  7 . 5 0  6 . 5 0  0 . 25  
1 9 7 . 0 0  5 . 5 0  7 . 5 0  6 . 5 0  0 . 25  
20 7 . 0 0  5 . 5 0  7 . 5 0  6 . 5 0  0 . 25  
21  7 . 0 0  5 . 5 0  7 . 5 0  6 . 5 0  0 . 25  
M aj ority rule 3 · 1 - 2 ,,,,,....,,... """" 4 ..._ 5
r el ation 1 s t  cycle las t 
Figu r e  i st 
SERIES 4 - Exp eriment 
A - 4  
B - 3 
c - Z  
D - 5 
E - 1 
SERIES 4 - Experiment 2 
A - 4  
B - 2. 
c - 3 
D - 5 
E - 1  
( I .  00) * 
Alternative S p e c i fica tion: SERIES 4 - Exp e r iment 2 1  
A - 4 
B - 2 
c - 3 
D - 5 
E - l 
t for key 11ee Figure 7 
A - l  
B - 5 
c . 4  
D - 3 
E - 2  
A - 2  
B - 5  
c - 2  
SERIES 4 • Expe r i ment 3 
-- � 
SERIES 4 - Exp,.dment 4 
D - 1 I . 0 0�0 . 
E - 3  M.,,_ D ' '* (1. 00) +. 
....._ _ __.. 20- 1 E 4-V E 
t !or key see · Figure 7 
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Our initial beliefs about the truth of eo or el were heavily
skewed in favor of e 1 as result of all the pilot experiments, We
as sume a critic would be much more skeptical, The a priori 
probabilities  we postulate as : 
Ours Our critics 
P(90 ) = . 1 P ' ( 90 ) = , 8 
P(91 ) = , 9 P1 ( e1 ) = , 2
In addition we as sume that our critic holds the the�ry that P(S ! 90 ) =· 0 
and for x f 5, P(x ! 90 ) = i (the probability that alternative 5 occurs 
is zero and all others  are equally likely).16 He agrees with us that
alternative 5 cannot result, If he takes any position other than that 
the rest  are equally likely then our tas k  would be to repeatedly induce 
the group to choos e  the least likely according to his beliefs , 
Even if e 1 is true, we do not have 100 percent confidence in 
our model. We would still say that thos e  events predicted by the 
model to have a probability of .90 or over have real probabilities of 
only about .7  of those of the model, That i s ,  for those x that the model 
' 
predicts that we can obtain with a probability of ,9 or more> we predict, 
P(x I e l ) = • 7 x probability predicted by the model,
We adopt our critics '  belief as to the probability of x for the 
case where e0 is true, We as sume aiso that our critic has no more
. confidence in .our model than we do for the case where e 1 i s  true.
We assume his beliefs about our model are the same as  ours ,  s ince 
having lesq faith in our model than we do would ultimately hurt his 
argument for the truth of eo . 
'Our beliefs in light of the results are : 
P(61 ) = , 9980 
P ' ( 61) = , 9 3 30 ,
16 . The dis tribution most likely t o  give the obs erved result ia . 
P ( l l eo) = 1 /2,  P ( 2 ! 6ol = P( 3 ! Elol = 1 /4 , P (4 ! 69) = P(S ! eol  = 
o. With
this null hypothesis P ' ( 61 ) below becomes . 8 362.
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We are almost  1 00 percent sure that the agenda matters  and our critic 
is ,93 sure .  
If our critic would not al low our explanation of Series 4 
Experiment 2, then a repetition of the argument . above would show 
that he has learned much les s from Series 4 and we would have 
learned nothing . Since the cost cf an additional experiment is about 
$ 1 7 0  (and s ince any critic can s tudy the pilot runs) ,  we elected not 
to try to convince this critic until we found a setting within which 
we could learn something additional ourselves , We conclude that 
the agenda influences the outcome. 
B. The Validity 'of the Model 
Even though our general theory may be right, the specific 
means of expre s s ing or modeling it that we have developed is probably 
wrong, We assert this on three grounds,  
First,  the model made a probability one prediction· which did 
not occur , This was the Series 4, Experiment 2 experience , While 
it is true that that event could easily be explained within the bounds 
' 
of our theory, the model itself leaves no room for such adjustments , 
We must either claim that the model applies only in the absence of 
straw votes or we mus t  adequately develop the model to allow for the 
influence of s traw votes .  Changing the predictions to correct fo� 
straw votes is unsatisfactory. 
Secondly we can, from S eries 4, test the values of two of the 
parameters . During this series, 5 2  votes were cast from s tate O!l 
(where all three rules dictate the same vote), and of thes e  50 were 
cast in the direction dictated by the thr ee qecision rule s ,  Thes e · 
con s titufe 5 2  Bernoulli trials with a probability P of succe; s ,  The 
hypothesis that P = ,96,  the number used in the model, is accepted 
at the .01 level of significance ,  This is particula,rly inter.e a ting 
s ince it  indicates that when individuals are in certain circumstances ,  
our model of  individual dec.isions is  very good indeed, Psychological
or other theoretical modifications are unnecessary. When all thre e  
rules cast compatible decisions, almost all behavior is  explained, 
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In addition to thos e  cast from a position of state O! 1 ,  there  
were  3 2  votes cast from Cl9 of which 27 were cast  in the proper
direction. According to the model these constituted 32 B ernoulli 
trials, each of which had a probability P of going in the proper 
direction. The hypothesis ,  P = ,62 ,  the value used in the model, is 
rejected at the .01 level of significance. From this we know that the 
model as presently s tructured i s  not perfect, There is definitely 
room for improvement in the parameter value s .  
W e  have one final test which can b e  reported which begins 
to answer the ques tion "How well does the model predict the vote s ?  1 1  
Figure 17 provides a coMparison between the actual vote and the 
predicted vote for each item of each experiment including all pilot
series.  The most s ignificant thing about this table is the apparent 
conservatism in the model suggested by the very infrequent
instance s  of the actual vote falling short of the expected vote ( eight 
out of 40 cases ) ,  This conservatism shows up again on the histogram 
of figure 1 8, If the theoretical distribution of votes for each item 
was normal then the histogram should approach a normal distribution 
curve. But, for all items · the th·eoreticaLdis tribution of votes 
was significantly skewed to the left (as shown by 3W"; on the' table) ,
Since the histogram is s trongly s kewed to the right, the accuracy of 
the model .is in even m�re doubt than the non-normality of the histo­
gram suggests, We suspect that this is a type of " bandwagon effect"
but we have not rigorously tested for this .
4 2  
Figur e 1 7  
TABLE DISTRIBUTION OF OU T C OMES * *  
Series Mean of Standard No . of Prob. o f  Prob . .  of 
Experiment wintvote s deviation wint · dire c - final 
Item Votes ti on . outc ome 
µ IT � x (x-µ) / <>  a c tually tak e n  
1 - 1 - 1 1 1 .5 7  1 .6 7  - . 4 8  1 2  . 2 5 7  . 9 0  \ 
1 - 1 - 2  . . 1 3 . 83 1 � 1 6  - . 7 1  1 5  1 . 0 1  1 . 0 0  . 6 5  . l - 1 - 3 1 0 . 84 1 .7 1  - .6 5  1 1  . 0 9 4  • 7 9  
1 -1 -4 1 0 . 85 . 95 - .4 7  . 1 1  . i 5 8  .93 
1 - 2 - 1  1 1 .5 7  1 . 67 - .4 8  1 5  2 . 0 6  . 9 0  
1 - 2 - 2' 1 3 . 8 3  1 . 1 6  - .7 1  1 9  4 . 46 1 . 0 0  .65 1 -2 - 3  1 0 . 84 1 .  71  - . 6 5  1 2  . 6 7 9  . 7 9  
1 - 2-4 1 0 . 85 . 9 5  - .47 1 3  2 . 2 7  . 9 3  
1 - 3 - 1 ':' · 1 0,. ss 1 .6 7  - .4 8  9 - 1 . 5 4  . 1 0  
1 - 3 - 2  1 0 .54 1 . 1 5  - .41 l l  .400 . 83 .0 8 
1 -3 - 3  1 2 . 2 0  1 . 3 8  - .6 2  1 1  - . 86 9 . 9 7  
1 -4 - 1  1 1 .5 7  1 . 6 7  - .4 8  1 1  - .3 4 1  . 9 0  
1 -4 -2 1 L48 1 .3 7  - .6 9  1 3 "  1 .1 1  . 93 .82 
1 -4 - 3  1 2 . 3 7  1 . 1 6 . - . 6 5  1 4  1 .40 . 9 9  
1 - 5 - 1  l L O O  1 .5 9  - . 7 8  1 3  1 . 26 . 8 3  
1 -5 - 2  1 1 .l 7 1 .5 2  - . 34 1 6  3 .1 8  . 87 . 5 8  1 -5 - 3  1 2 . 2 1  1 .4 8  - .7 2  1 3  . 5 3 4  ; 9 7  
1 - 5 - 4  1 0 .40 1 .05 - . 40 1 0 .5 . o q 5  . 8 2  
1 - 6 - 1  1 L0 3  1 .43 - .45 1 2  . 6 7 9  . 86 
1 - 6 - 2  1 0 .5 8 1 .46 - . 6 4  1 1  . 2 8 8  . 7 8  . 6 1  1 - 6 - 3  1 1 .2 1  1 . 1 6  -.• 7 7  . 1 2  . 6 82 . 9 3  
1 - 6 -4 . 1 2 . 6 2  1 .42 - . 8 8  . 1 3  . 2 6 7  . 9 8  
2 - 1 - 1  1 9 .49 1 . 1 4  - . 94 2 1  l . 3 2  1 .0 0  
2 - 1 - 2 *  1 3 .34 1 . 9 0  - 1 . 1 1 1 0  - L 76 . 0 7  . 0 7  
2 - 1 - 3 1 1 . 85 1 . 0 0  - .4 8  1 3  1 . 1 5  .9 2  
3 - 1 - 1 1 7 .42 1 .64 - 1 . 1 0  2 0  1 .5 8  1 . 0 0  .0 8 3 - l - 2 ([tem sf 1 1 . 85 1 . 00 - . 4 8  1 0  - 1 . 85 . 0 8  
3 - 2 - 1  ':' 1 9 .26 1 .2 1  - .9 8  "S - 9 .3 3  .oo . 0 0  3 - 2 - 2  1 7 . 1 9  1 . 6 9  . - 1 . 1 3  1 6  • 70 6" 1 .0 0  
4-1 - 1  1 8.34 1 .44 - 1 .04 21 1 . 85 1 .0 0  1 .0 0  4 - 1 - 2  1 3 .6 5  1 .0 0  - .64 15 . 1 .3 5  1 .0 0  
4 - 2 - 1 "'� 1 7 .6 5  1 . 59 - 1 . 0 9  8 - 6 . 0 8  . .oo 
4 - 2- 2 * 1 6 .73 1 .7 8  - 1 . 1 6  5 - 6 . 5 9  . 0 0  . o o  
4 - 2 - 3  1 9 . 9 5  . 9 9  - . 8 7  2 1  1 .0 6  1 .0 0  
4-21-1  1 2 .73 1 . 27 - .7 7  1 3  . 2 1 3  . 9 6  . 96 4 - 21- 2 1 3 .6 5  1 . 00 - . 64 1 6  2 . 3 5  1 .0 0  
4- 3 - 1  1 7 .65 1 .5 9  - 1 . 0 9  1 8  . 2 2 0  l •. o o  1 .0 0  4 - 3 - 2 ([tem 3t' 1 3 .6 5  1 . 0 0  - . 6 4  1 4  . 3 5 0  1 .0 0  
4-4- 1 1 7 .42 1 . 64 - 1 . 1 0  20 1 .5 8  L O O  1 .0 0  4 - 4 - 2  1 3 .65 1 .0 0  - .64 1 4  .35 0 LOO 
t"win" means that vote went in the direction i ndi c ated m o s t  pr obable by the 
model . 
*The s e  experiments did not result in the anticipated outcome. 
**Data wer e p o ole d fr om all exper iments exc ep t  l- 3 ,  3 -2 ,  4 - 2 ,  4 - 2 1 • 
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CONSISTEN T USE O F  VO TING RU LES 
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Rule 1 = Sincere; Rule 2 = wors t  a voidance; Rule 3 = a verage value. 
Number 
of 
in di vidua I s  
· in Y* 
J O  
1 0  
I 
6 
4 
6 
37 
Y* .= the s e t  of individuals for which the consistent u s e  of any of the three voting 
rules would have been inconsis tent with the consilltent use of either of the other 
two voti':lg rules. 
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C. Individual Voting Rules 
Of par ticular interest to us were the patterns of individual 
decis ions.  Does an individual always use the same decision rule? 
If this were the case, we could considerably improve upon the accuracy 
of the model but we do.not yet have much data. Of the 261 individuals 
who participated in thes e  experiments, only thirty-s even were involved 
17 in a s eries of voting situations which would necessarily reveal the 
individual 1 s voting rule, Figure 1 9  indicates that 70 percent of thes e  
thirty-s even subjects exhibited consistent behavior. The average 
valu<;i hypothesis was the most popular with about 46 percent of these 
subjects using it .  The next largest  group, 30 percent, used none of 
these rules consis tently, If the s e  proportions are characteristic of 
the population at large, then it may be pos sible to improve the model 
by using the behavior exhibited on the first item to calculate the s trength 
of later items , The fact, however, that so many individua�s did not 
consis tently use any of the rules suggests that some sort of probabilistic 
treatment of individual decision rules  may always be necess
.
ary. 
V III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our res earch has incorporated s everal features not found (at 
leas t  all in one place) in the economics and politics .literature, Firs t, 
our characterization of voting procedures is differ ent from that found 
in the social-choice and voting literature, With the exception of 
Farquharson (3], research in thos e  areas has been focused on proces se s  
in which alternatives are considered in a s eries o f  binary (two at a time) 
contests ,  The voting procedure we s tudy_ involves voting between 
17. Any individual from among the thirty- s even who consistently 
used any of the three rules would have exhibited behavior inconsistent · 
with the use of either of the other two rules. 
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s et s  of i s su e s .  Our theory is decision theoretic in origin, but we 
depart from the traditional decis ion-theoretic mode of analysis by 
treating individuals as random variables over decision rules , Our 
approach is s imilar to the theory being developed by Bass [ 2 J in 
, 
which preferences are treated as s toch'astic , A third unusual feature 
of this s tudy was our acc e s s  to so many paramete r s  in a proc e s s  as 
complicated as the flying club meeting, 
Finally, our choice of an experimental methodology is 
certainly not typical of mode s  of analysis u s e d  by economists , Our 
posture is s imple, If by using our ideas about the influence of the 
agenda, we are unable to influence the decis ions of groups in a 
simple laboratory s e tting, then we cannot in good faith claim that 
our theory worked in the more complicated case of the flying club. 
We look to the laboratory· to reject our hypothes e s  about a real-world 
event, In a s en s e ,  this is a negative posture .  We can never really 
· know what caused the flying club decision, We can only reject alterna­
tive explanations by repeated application of our methodology. 
What are the pos s ible implications of what we did and of what 
we think we might learn to do ? Can the agenda of any committee which 
follows Robert' s Rule s of Order be modeled along the lines we outlined? 
We think the answer is, generally not. Mo s t  such bodies have rules 
which allow for changing the agenda itself a s  well as rules which allow 
for the pos s ibility of recalling p reviously eliminated alternativ e s , But 
the order and phra's ing of motions and amendments under Robert' s Rules 
or other similar parliamentary proced;,r e s  is clearly susceptible to 
analys is us ing our model, And some deliberative bodie s ,  such as the 
U. S. House of Repres entatives,  allow subgroups such as the Rules 
Committee to cr eate agendas for floor votes that ar e difficult to change. 
Other s ,  such as international conference s ,  deeide firs t  on agendas .-, 
before l?roceeding to "subs tance ,  11 We have not yet specified' the class 
of real-world proc e s s e s  which use ag'endas of the form we use,  We 
are s till working on it. 
If the r e  are many real-world analogs to the proc e s s e s  we 
have modeled, our r e s earch rais e s  important e thical and practical 
issue s ,  Casual obs ervation suggests that proce s s es are accepted 
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as le gitimate becaus e they are thought to allow decisions to be based 
on the subs tantive merits of the alternatives pres ented, Procedures 
are expected to be dominated by subs tance, But if there is no out­
come which the group "wants "  independently of the procedure u s ed 
to reach the decision, all we can do is choose an acc eptable agenda 
which dictates the final r e sult, Such a s ituation, if e s tablished, 
would clearly require a rethinking of our attitude s  toward decision 
procedur e s ,  Interpreted least s keptically, our r e s earch so far 
suggests that there are such s ituations (the flying club dec ision) and 
that some people (the flying club group chairman) are able to intuit 
which procedural decisions will work to their advantage and use them. 
Ii this is true, then tho s e  of us who are l e s s  talented might function 
more successfully if the factors influencing the outcome s  of group 
decisions were more generally known, 
One might surmise that we pre sun1e too much in raising such 
i s sues becau s e  once the influence of the agenda is known to the partici� 
pants in a group decision, it will cease to affec t  them. If correct, 
this is an ar gument for pursuing and de s s eminating r e sults such as 
our s ,  But we suspect that many of the outcomes we reached in our, 
experiments would have been reached by a group that was familiar 
with the principles involved, once any 'given agenda had been adopted, 
Should further experimentat�on confirm our suspicions , we can only 
speculate about the difficulties knowledgeable groups may have in 
s olving the infinite regres s of determining an agenda for deciding on 
an agenda, 
The r e  is no need to take a Machiavellian posture and as sume 
that our r e sults ar� only u s eful in attempts to control people, Once the 
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influence of the agenda is generally understood, ' we can use the knowledge 
to gain insights into the way complex group proce s s es actually function 
and refine our attitudes toward them, Our untested suspicion is that 
institutions frequently cause groups to take pos itions as a r esult of 
some i.n'advertant procedural dec is ion rather than because of facts 
and preferenc e s .  More generally, pur suing this line of inquiry may 
enable us to recognize the limitations of the processes  we use 'to make 
group decis ions and to "design around" them to the extent possible. 
Further res earch may enable us to specify accurately the univer s e  
o f  decis ion procedures not subject to agenda influences ,  thus facili-
tating proces s  s election, 
All this emphasizes the importance of finding out more about 
the phenomenon we are investigating, Our ·experiments were s imple; 
the real world is complex. In the real world, groups debate alternatives 
which lend themselves to argument and discuss ion, Argument and 
discus s ion may involve appeals to general principles which create 
conflicting preferences in bdividual participants . The personalities 
of individual participants may exert positive or negative influences on 
the votes of other members of the group. Leadership, charisma, and 
feelings of deference may give the preferences of one individual mpre 
weight in the proces s  than the preferenc e s  of other s ,  Previous group 
history may influence events , Agenda ite.ms may be recharacterized 
or perceivec;! differently by the introduction into the discus s ion of facts 
or projection s .  Finally, feelings of "fairnes s ,  11 either in the form of 
attachment to certain processes  or of ·limits to the effects of outcomes 
on other individuals in the group, may exert important influences on 
decisions ,  The experimental environment may have suppressed many 
of these effects . Thes e  and other real-world features r emain to be 
investigated. But the very fact that experimental results could sugges t  
such inquiries highlights the potential importance o f  even ou.r limited 
findings ,  
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A PPENDIX 
INSTRUCTIONS AND OTHER MATERIAL 
RELATING TO SERIES THREE 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
1 .  W e  a r e  int e r e s te d  in c e r tain technical a spec ts of the way committee s  o-pe rate, 
You ha ve been a s ked to p a r ticipate in a committee. proc es s expe rimen t which 
might h e l p  us unde r s tand c e r tain a s pects of the se genera lly complex proC'e s s e s ,  
Suppor t  f o r  this r e �ea rch ha s been s uppl ied b y  the National Scienc e Foundation 
and the He nry Luce Foundation . 
2, You a r e  the p r e s ident and owner of a small company th at s pecia li ze s in 
proc e s s ing a n d  s e ll in g a food specia lty item ( chocolate pizza ) .  The r e  a r e  
twenty - on e  simi l a r  fi rms i n  the s tate. E a c h  firm s e l l s  and delive r s  only 
in its own a r ea so. the r e  is no competition betwe en fi r ms ,  Th e r e  is sub s tantial 
competition, howeve r, from p roduc e rs of c los ely re lated prod uc ts , 
You are current ly  a ttending a meeti n g  of a trade a s s ociation o q �an ized and 
maintained by the fi r m s . The a s s ocia tion performs s e v e r a l  va luable s e r vices 
and has for several years been considering the expansion of se rvic es  to the 
adver ti s ing field. Pros pec ts and a l ternatives have been carefully r e s e a rched 
and eve ryone agrees  that some sort of s tate -wide a dve rti s in g  program should 
be undertaken. The pu rpo s e  of this meeting is to decide upon the s pec ific s 
of the p rog ram, 
Many a l te rnative p r o g r a m s  h a v e  b e e n  propo s e d  and debated over t h e  years , 
Resea rch and comp rom is e have narrowed the options to five competing 
progra m s , Choice from among the s e  five is  to be decided by majority 
vote o( the me mbe r s . 
· 
Your s ta H  membe r s  have s tudie<l the competing programs and their cha ra c ­
teristic s c a re fully. From this s tudy they have deter mined the value of each 
pro gram in te rm s  of .your net profit. The s e  figure s are not generally known 
and for antitrus t  r ea s ons should not be. discus s e d ,  Furthermor e ,  the s e  !i :ure1 
can dUfe r !rom company to company becaus e advertising which appeals to 
cus tomer s  o( s o me firms can have a negative appeal t o the custome r s  of 
othe r fi r ms . 
3. The purpos e of the m e e ting is to d ec ide by majority rule wh ich one of the 
five advertising programs shall  be us ed by the trade a s s ocia tion. Only one 
of the five will  be chosen, and the paym ent yqu will  receive depends en ti re ly 
on which one it i s ,  For exampl e ,  on 'the tablk on p. 3, the amount l i s ted 
under "net value " fo r prof.( ram A i s  the amo•\nt you wi l l  rec eive i f  it i s  ·chr,scn; 
the amount l i s te d  under "net value" for program B i s the amount you will 
r ec eive ii it is chos en ; u tc ,  You will  be paid in cash immediately a fter the 
· me eting. You must not reveal � quantitative information about your 
payment. Thes e  payments differ among committee member s ,  Only you a re 
to know anything about how much you may rec eive. 
Instructions 
4, The committee mus t follow s ome rules of o rd e r .  The basic procedure 
will be majority rul e .  Aside from that, we will follow some rather common 
p a r liamentar y r ul e s .  The s e  will be reviewed by a chairma n who has been 
a sked to conduct the m e e ting . 
In many groups i t  is common for the decision to be _made using an a genda 
p r epar ed by the -chairman or a rules committe e .  For this committee the 
agenda i s  on the attached page.  Study thi s  a genda so you will und e r s tand 
how the busine s s  will proce e d, It will be covered in de tail by the chairman. 
5, . Here ar e  s ome inciden tals : 
a. You a r e - a s ked to fil l  i n  the a ppropriate blank spac e s  under each item, 
The s e  s e rv e  a s a re cord o f  your vote and the way you u nders tand 
the motion at the time of voting , 
b, In addition to your written r ecord we will a s k  a r ecor ding • ecre ta ry 
to r ec o rd each vote , This can take some time so we a s k  you to 
hold your hand high until all votes a r e  r ec orded ,  
c .  Remembe r you a re n o t  t o  m ention monetary amount s .  In addition, 
before or du rin g  the experiment, ple a s e  do not discus s with other 
pa r ti cipa nts any ac tivity to take place after the experiment which 
may involve you jointly, Under no circumstances may you make 
either threats or "deals " to split your payoff from the meeting with 
another participant, 
6, Do you have any question s ?  
Committee Member No, 
$ 
Proposing Unifyi ng Primary Primary Free M ajor N et 
A gency Theme M edium Endor s er Samples M agazine V alue 
ro ram 
A Gotham Co. ye s o ky - Andy no Mad 
writin g  Granatelli Magazine 
B Gotham Co. no bathroom A ndy ye s A ction 
walls G r a natelli Comi c s 
c Gotham Co , ye s s ky - Ol ga no A ction 
writing Kor butt Cornice 
D Metropolis no s ky· An dy yes Mad 
Inc. wr iting Granatelli Ma ga zine 
E Metropolis yes bathroom Olga yes Mad 
Inc, walls Ko rbutt Maguµie 
THE AGENDA 
Item I .  Which advertising agency s hould we use? (Check choice and £ill in .£.2!.h. 
blanks ).  
___ I a m  in favor of cons idering further only those p r og r a ms p r oposed by 
Gotham Co. (, ________________________) fill in. 
___ I am in favor of cons idering further only tho·s e  prog r a ms proposed by 
Metropoli s ,  Inc , (, ____________________) fill in. 
Ite m  2. Shall the program have a unifying theme ? ( Check choice and fill in both 
blanks ) .  
___ O f  the progra ms r e ma ining, I am in favor of considering fu rther only tho s e 
programs whic h  have a unifying theme. _______________) fill ln. 
--- Of the programs r e maining, I am in favor of considering further only tho s e  
programa which £2. .2.2.t have a. unifying theme. ) fill in, 
. lli!!l..l· Which major magazines should' be used? ( Check choice and !ill in both 
blanks ),  
Of the programs re maining, I am in favor of considering further only those 
programs which use Mad Magazine as the major magazine. _______ )fill in. 
__ 0£ the progra�s r emaining, I am in favor of considering further only those 
programs which ·use A ction Comics as the major maga:rine.· 
RESPONSES WHICH INDICATE 
U N CONTROLLED INCE N TIV.I!: STRUCTURE 
SERIES 3 EXP. Z 
"I thi nk unifying theme is mo re effectiv� . " 
"Because Gotham Co. p rogra m is cheaper 
and probably more effe c t i ve . " 
"A s�all g roup of companies would ha ve a 
greater impact on the consuming public with 
a direct, eas il y rememb..,red theme tha n with 
a less concent rate� a pproach . "  
"I wanted skywriting because I can 't  imagine 
bathroom walls a s  an effective media. " 
A PPENDIX II 
INSTRUCTIONS USED IN SERIES FOUR 
CHAIRMAN INSTRUCTIONS 
You are employed to serve as chairman of s everal committee 
meetings ,  The time and loC:ation o� .the s e  meetings are on the attached 
page, Each meeting will last about forty- five minutes ,  You should be 
at the des ignated location thirty minutes before the meeting s tarts and 
you should have familia rized your s elf with the rules of order which are 
attached, For your participation you will be paid five dollar s  per !Jpur 
plus any neces sary expenses ,  e . g. parking, which you incur, 
The s e  meetings are part of a s eries of experiments des igned 
to test theories about decis ion proc e s s e s ,  Beyond this introductory 
remark, you will not be made aware of the purposes of the exper�ments 
until after the entire series has been completed. You should avoid 
talking with anyone about � aspects of the experiments,  your employ­
ment, or about any pos s ibly related theories ,  You should avoid circu�­
s tances in which you might inadvertantly become informed. Do not try 
. to guess  the nature of the hypotheses or supply your own th.
eories, 
After the final meeting you will receive a detailed explanation. 
The first thing to do is check the dates and the times .  Make. 
sure you can be there. They are listed here as "Attachment No. l . "  
Attachment 2 i s  a copy o f  the instructions that members of 
the committee will receive,  You should read the s e  instructions now, 
Here are some things that should be underlined: 
1, People are free to s ay anything they wish which pertains to the 
motion o.n the floor. If discussion !l · are "out of order, " you can 
make that judgment. In particular ,  the following are not to be 
allowed:  
a )  Statements· which contain do�lar o r  quantitative referencesi 
b)  Straw votes on i s sues other than the current is sue to be 
discu s s ed and voted upon, as will be explicitly described 
on the agenda; and 
c )  Threats or dealings between committee members to be 
carried through during or after the experiment is over. 
2, "Majority rule means a majority of those pre s ent. A vote pas s e s  
if i t  rece ives eleven or more vote s ,  If an item on the agenda fails 
both vote s ,  you call for more discuss ion, After discuss ion another 
vote is taken. If neither pas s e s  you move to the next item on the 
agenda. An ambiguity after all items on the agenda are covered, 
can be resolved by a motion from the floor . 
PAR LIAMENTARY RULES FOR CHA IR MA N  
Read the appropriate por tions at the appropriate times .  
Recognition rule : Raise  you hand to be recognized by the chair , 
Voting rule :  TI1e bas ic voting rule is simple majority rule, An issue 
pas s e s  if it pas ses  by a majority of thos e  voting. 
Rule to break t.ies : (read this if nec e s s ary) If a tie vote occurs discuss ion 
of the motion is again opened. After debate a second vote is taken, If 
a tie occurs again debate is opened again and a vote is taken, If a tie 
occurs again the committee moves to consider the next issue. Any 
ambiguity at the encl of the last item can be removed by a motion from 
the floor • .  
Rule to end debate : If someone wishes to end the debate on an item they 
s im.ply move to end debate . If there is no objection to ending debate 
the item is voted upon. 
(Read if nec e s s ary) 
If there  is obj ection to ending debate the motion to end debate will be 
recognized by the chair. A vote on the motion to end debate will be taken. 
If it pas ses by 2/3  majority of those voting the debate end s .  If the motion 
to end debate fails,  debate on the main motion continues,  
Agenda : 
The agenda committee has adopted the agenda which is ·before you, Not}ce 
that each item on the agenda is des igned to restrict the numbe r  of pro­
grams which may receive furth e r  considera:tion, 
Example :  Choice of a banquet 
Alternative No. Tipe of Food 
1 Mexican 
2 Mexic.-.n 
3 French 
4 French 
Dre s s  
Formal 
Informal 
Formal 
Informal 
J l  
Item 1 .  Shall we have a formal dre s s  banquet or not? . Notice that an 
� to this ques tion will r e s tr ic t  further deliberation to either 
or 
Item 2,  Wh a t  type of food? Notice that an answer to this question is 
;an that we need to decide upon a specific alternative. 
I I 
INSTRU CTIONS FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
l ,  We would like for you to par ticipate in a committee proc e s s  experiment, 
The purpo s e  of the experiment is to help us unders tand certain technical 
aspects of the generally complex ways in which committees operate. 
Support for this res earch was supplied by the National Science Founda­
tion and the Henry Luc e  Foundation. 
z. All you have to do is to attend a committee meeting and for this 
participa tion you will be paid, The purpos e  of the meeting is to choose 
by majority rule a letter from the set of l etters [A, B, C,  D, EJ. Only 
one of the five letter s  will be chosen and the payment you receive for 
participation depends entirely upo11 which one it i s ,  For example, on 
the tab)e on p. 3, the amount lis ted beside the letter A is the amount 
you \vill receive if it is chosen by the committee;  the amount beside 
B is the pay1:.-ient you will receive if it is the majority decision, etc. 
Different individuals will receive different payoffs depending upon 
which letter the committee choos e s ,  The letter which would r e sult 
in the highe s t  payment to you may not r esult in the highes t  payment 
to someone else. You should decide after deliberation how you wish 
the committee to vote and make whatever efforts you might want to 
get the vote to go that way. However, in general, we as experimenter s  
a r e  not conce1•ned with whether or how you participate in the committee ' s  
ei'fort t o  select a letter. 
We want the meeting to proceed in an orderly fashion so we have 
provided a few parliamentary procedures which mus t  be followed, 
The s e  will be explained by the chairman, We als o want to make 
sure that you unders tand the consequence s  of your votes and any_ 
resulting committee decision, For this purpos e  we ask you to 
answer the questions on p. 4 after the chairman has reviewed the 
rules and the agenda. 
3 ,  Here are some incidentals : 
a, The basic procedure will be s imple majority rule, We will also 
follow the a genda prepared by an agenda committee, This 
agenda is outlined on P• 3 and should be s tudied carefully. It will 
also be covered by the chairman. 
b, You will from time to time be voting. We have appointed a record­
ing s ec retary to record all vote s .  This can take s ome time s o  we 
ask you to holc:l your hands high until all votes are r ecorded. 
c ,  You will be paid in cash immediately after the meeting. You may 
not reveal any quantitative information about your payment. 
You can if you wish s ay that one yields more than another but 
you may not s ay how much mor e .  The amounts may differ among 
committee members and only you are to know anything about how 
much you inay receive • 
. d, Before or during the meeting please do not discuss with other com­
mittee members any activity to take place after the meeting which 
may involve you jointly. Under no circumstances may you make 
threats or "deals 11  to split your payment from the meeting with 
another committee member, 
4, Are there any. que s tions? 
\ .'i •  
SERIES 4 EXPERIMENTS l A ND Z 
Individual Payment and A genda Section of Individual Instructions 
Committee Member ----
Letter 
A 
B 
"'c 
D 
E 
Payment 
to you 
Item l .  Do we want to cons ide r further only the letters A and B or 
only the lette r s  C ,  D, and E? ( Check your vote) 
I am in favor of cons idering further only the letters A and B. · 
I am in favo r  of considering fur ther only the letters C, D, and E, 
Item Za. ( U the letters A ,  B are chosen at Item 1 then this item . is 
applicable - if not then go to Zb, ) Which do we want, A or B? 
1 am in favor of A .  
I a m  in favor o f  B. 
Item 2b. (·If the lette rs C, D, and E are chosen at Item 1 then this item is 
applicabl e .- otherwi s e  go to Za, ) Do we want to consider 
furthe r only the letters D a,nd E or do we want to stop with C ? ·  
I am in favor o f  C .  
I a m  in favor o f  considering further only the letter's D and E, 
Item 3.  Do w e  want D or E? 
. .  
I am in favor of D, 
I am in favor of E, 
SERIES 4 EXPERIMENTS l AND Z 
Agenda Tes t Section of Individual Instructions 
I. Suppose the top box at Item 1, the one that contains the letters 
A and B, received a majority of the vote s .  Then, the nilxt item 
fo b e  considered on the agenda is , and i t  con s is ts of 
a vote b e tween the lette r ( s )  ___ and the lett e r ( s )  ___ • 
2, · Supp o s e  at Item 1 the box of l e tt e r s  that contains the lette r s  C, D, 
and E is cho s e n  by a majority. Then the next item t.o b e  cons idered 
on the agenda is , and i t  consists of a vote b e tween 
the letter( s )  ___ and the l e tte r ( s )  ___ ._ . 
3, If the box of letters that contains A and B recei�ed a majority 'vote 
at Item 1, would there be a vote a t  Item 3? Answer Yes or N o;____, 
If i t  happened that the box of l e tters containing C ,  D, and E received a 
majority of vot � s  at Item 1, and a vote was not needed at Item 3, then 
the box
.
containing the letter ___ must have received the majority 
o-f votes and thu s would b e  the committee 1 s  final choice.  
.4. Ii _at each item the lower arrow was followed by the majority of 
5, 
votes,  then the committee will h ave made the final choice 
and you will r eceive the an;1ount a s  your payoff. 
How much will you receive if the co�mittee 1 s  final choice is 
D? ___ . B?_ C? A? 
SERIES 4 EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4 
Individual · Payment and Agenda Section of Individual Ins truction 
Committee Member No. 
Letter 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Payment 
to you 
Item 3 
AGENDA l�e m  Zq . f.i 
I n�e;; i � I -.�  . 
I B �B A C . C 
I Item Zb I 
1n1 ---1--£1 I I �§] I 
I I I 
I I I 
Item l .  Do we want to consider further only the letters A ,  B, and C or 
only the letters D and E? (Check your vote) 
I am in favor of cons idering further only the letters  A ,  B, and C. 
I am in favor of considering further only the letter s  D · and E .  
Item Za . ( If  the letters A ,  B and C are chosen a t  Item l then this item is 
applicable -- if not then go to Zb. ) Do we want to consider further 
. only the letters A and B' or d<;> we want to stop with C? · 
I am in favor of cons idering further only the letters A and B .  
I a m  in favor of C .  
Item Zb. ( If  the letters D and E are chosen a t  Item l then· this item is 
applicable -- otherwi s e  go to .Za, ) Which do we want, D or E? 
Item 3. 
I am in favor of D. 
·1 am in favor of E. 
Do we want A or B? 
I am in favor of A .  
I a m  in favor o f  B; 
SERIES 4 EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4 
Agenda Test Section of Individual Instruction 
1.  Suppose the top box at Item 1 ,  the one that contains the lette r s  A, 
B,  and C received a majority of the vote s .  Then, the next item 
to be considered on the agenda is , and it  consists of 
a vote betwe en the lette r ( s )  ___ and the letter ( s )  ___ • 
2; Suppose at Item l the box of letters that contains the letters D 
and E is chosen by a majority. Then the next item ·to be considered 
on the agenda is · , and it consists of a vote between 
the letter(s)  ___ and the letter( s )  ___ • 
3 ,  If  the box of letters that contains D and E rec eived a majority vote 
at  Item 1 ,  would the r e  be a vote at Item 3? Ans wer Yes or No • 
If it happened that the box of letters containing A, B, and C r ec eived 
a majority of votes at Item 1 ,  and a· vote was not needed at Item 3,  
then the box containing t h e  letter mus t  have received the 
, majority of votes and thus would �ommittee ' s  final choice. 
4. ·If at each item the lower arrow was followed by the majority of 
votes ,  then the committee will have made the final 
choice and you will receive the amount as your payoff. 
5, How much Will you receive if the c,ommittee1 s  final choice i s  
D? ---- B ?  ___ C? ____ A? ----
